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ACHIEVING PROPER TECHNOLOGY SPECIFICITY 
Sarah A. Geers∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At the simplest level, the “misty”1 requirement of nonobvious-
ness is the line that separates innovations that are worthy of patent 
protection from those that are not.
2
  To gain a government-sponsored 
monopoly via patent protection, an invention must be not only new 
and useful but also nonobvious.
3
  Unfortunately, despite the funda-
mental importance of plotting this nonobviousness line, it has a his-
tory of torturing the inquiries of fact finders.  Increasingly, the broad 
spectrum of industries and “useful Arts”4 that utilize the patent sys-
tem also clouds the inquiry, which is reflected in court decisions that 
unwittingly develop technology-specific jurisprudence by according 
precedential value to the factual circumstances of a particular case.  
This interpretive turmoil, and perhaps its resolution, arises in trying 
to understand the “level of ordinary skill in the art,” a legal determi-
nation that is critical to drawing the obviousness line but that neces-
sarily rests on the factual circumstances of an industry or art.
5
  To pe-
netrate the mist surrounding the level of ordinary skill, fact finders 
with little or no knowledge of a technological field require an analyti-
cal framework in which to ground their obviousness inquiry. 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2010, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S. Chemistry and 
B.A. Spanish Studies, High Distinction, 2003, University of Minnesota.  I would like 
to thank Professor David Opderbeck for his insightful comments.  I would also like to 
thank Nick Holiday for his ceaseless encouragement, support, and patience. 
 1 Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501, 503–04 (2d Cir. 1960) (“The test laid down 
is indeed misty enough. . . . To judge on our own that this or that new assemblage of 
old factors was, or was not, ‘obvious’ is to substitute our ignorance for the acquain-
tance with the subject of those who were familiar with it.”). 
 2 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966). 
 3 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2006). 
 4 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
 5 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007); Graham, 383 U.S. at 
17; infra Part III.A. 
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Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed the 
issue of obviousness in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
6
 a land-
mark case examining the obviousness of an automotive brake pedal 
technology.  This decision arguably departed significantly from pre-
vious obviousness jurisprudence developed by the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit, which handles all patent appeals.  Both 
the doctrinal upheaval and the mechanical nature of the invention in 
KSR
7
 raise an important question as to how the decision will affect fu-
ture obviousness determinations in other industries.  Most critically, 
the reliance on “common sense” in the Court’s analysis8 must be ex-
amined carefully for applicability to other cases, more closely aligned 
with the realities of the fact finder’s decision-making process, and ul-
timately reconciled with the fundamental goals of the patent system. 
Although it upset the pre-KSR standard, the Court did not ven-
ture any jurisprudence to stand in its place, thus leaving lower courts 
and practitioners with the daunting task of developing new formula-
tions of the obviousness inquiry.  In theory, any lack of jurispruden-
tial uniformity arising from the absence of a workable analytical 
framework will increase uncertainty in the patentability of inven-
tions—a likely disincentive for industries to innovate.  Then again, 
the Court has opened the way for the development of jurisprudence 
to address the needs and circumstances of particular industries in a 
clearer, more reasoned—and less ad hoc—manner.  Furthermore, 
with the jurisprudential basis of previous industry-specific decisions 
undermined, courts will also have greater flexibility to depart from 
years of precedent that is no longer appropriate for particular tech-
nologies.  Thus, KSR presents an opportunity to begin to approach 
the obviousness inquiry correctly. 
This Comment contends that a fact- and evidence-based, rather 
than a primarily prior-art-based, approach embodies this flexibility 
while considering the needs and circumstances of each patentee in-
dustry with particularity.  In examining obviousness in the mechani-
cal, computer, and pharmaceutical arts, two general trends emerge 
with respect to so-called “secondary consideration” objective evi-
dence.  First, this Comment will argue that generalizing typical indus-
trial circumstances at the time of invention yields a factual presump-
tion about obviousness for each industry—a presumption of 
obviousness for mechanical and computer inventions and a presump-
 
 6 KSR, 550 U.S. 398. 
 7 See id. at 405–09. 
 8 Id. at 420. 
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tion of nonobviousness for pharmaceutical inventions.  Second, this 
Comment demonstrates that the importance of postinvention objec-
tive evidence varies according to the industry; evidence of commer-
cial success, copying, and laudatory statements deserves the most 
weight for traditional mechanical inventions, the least weight for 
computer inventions, and a weight somewhere in the middle for 
pharmaceutical inventions.  Focusing the inquiry in these two ways is 
critical to lend further predictability and stability to the obviousness 
jurisprudence across industries.  Finally, this Comment concludes 
that a focus on secondary-considerations evidence is proper because 
this is the best evidence of an industry’s patent needs. 
Part II of this Comment analyzes the evolution of obviousness ju-
risprudence culminating in the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR and 
then turns to a comparison of the theoretical neutrality of the patent 
system and the reality of industry-specific patentability results.  Part 
III discusses how to properly understand the Person Having Ordinary 
Skill in the Art (PHOSITA) construct by elevating the importance of 
“secondary considerations” available at the time of invention and 
analyzes how the resultant obviousness findings can then be corrobo-
rated via related postinvention evidence.  Part III then demonstrates 
how properly understanding the PHOSITA in the context of a par-
ticular industry improves the outcomes of industry-specific decisions, 
then compares these results to recent Federal Circuit decisions, and 
concludes by reconciling the results of this analytical framework to 
the goals of the patent system.  Finally, Part IV offers closing thoughts 
on how objective evidence is the most direct indicator of an indus-
try’s patent needs and is thus the best guidepost for the obviousness 
fact finder. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NONOBVIOUSNESS REQUIREMENT 
ENCOMPASSES ITS APPLICATION TO EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 
A. The Meaning of “Obvious” Continues to Evolve 
The precise contours of the obviousness standard are critical for 
several reasons.  It is one of three basic statutory requirements for pa-
tentability of an invention.
9
  Obviousness is also the most litigated as-
pect of patent validity.
10
  Apart from its status as a threshold require-
 
 9 These three requirements are utility, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); “novelty,” id. § 
102; and “nonobviousness,” id. § 103.  See also, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder 
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 149–50 (1989) (discussing the relationship among 
these three requirements). 
 10 LAURENCE H. PRETTY, PATENT LITIGATION 1-40 (2004). 
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ment for patentability, it is also a particularly difficult determination 
arising throughout the life cycle of a patent—during both the patent 
application process and any subsequent infringement and validity lit-
igation.  Although the obviousness issue must be addressed and de-
cided at least once for every patent, the technical analysis neverthe-
less rests largely on the facts of a particular case as interpreted by a 
frequently untrained decision maker
11
 via a minimal theoretical 
framework.
12
  Likewise, although the specialized Federal Circuit was 
created in large part to remedy the “inherent ambiguity and com-
plexity of the obviousness standard”13 by increasing uniformity,14 the 
Supreme Court’s reversal in KSR demonstrates that the flux in the 
obviousness doctrine continues.  As Judge Learned Hand observed, 
nonobviousness is “as fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and vague a 
phantom as exists in the whole paraphernalia of legal concepts.”15 
Hindsight bias is the most dangerous aspect of the obviousness 
determination because the fact finder always analyzes and decides 
with the benefit of knowledge that the putative inventor has already 
contributed to the public.  Many jurisprudential developments in the 
history of the nonobviousness requirement occurred in part to re-
duce this temptation to succumb to hindsight bias.
16
  But it may be 
cognitively impossible for humans to disregard knowledge of an oc-
currence when calculating its possibility ex post facto.
17
  Therefore, 
 
 11 The major exception, of course, is the patent examiner, who is required to 
have a formal education in science or engineering.  U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 
Patent Examiner Positions, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/exam.htm (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2010). 
 12 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966); infra Part II.A.2. 
 13 Sean M. McEldowney, Note, New Insights on the “Death” of Obviousness: An Empir-
ical Study of District Court Obviousness Opinions, 2006 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, ¶ 1, 
http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/McEldowney-Obviousness.pdf. 
 14 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996); H.R. REP. 
NO. 97-312, at 20–23 (1981). 
 15 Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950). 
 16 For example, hindsight at least partially motivated both the Supreme Court’s 
“secondary considerations” and the Federal Circuit’s “teaching-suggestion-
motivation” test.  See, e.g., Graham, 383 U.S. at 36 (“[Secondary considerations] may 
also serve to ‘guard against slipping into use of hindsight’ and to resist the tempta-
tion to read into the prior art the teachings of the invention in issue.”) (citation 
omitted); In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“To counter this 
potential weakness in the obviousness construct, the suggestion to combine require-
ment stands as a critical safeguard against hindsight analysis and rote application of 
the legal test for obviousness.”).  
 17 Gregory Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious II: Experimental Study on the Hindsight Issue 
Before the Supreme Court in KSR v. Teleflex, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 8 (2006).  Based on 
his research, Professor Mandel argues that none of patent law’s doctrinal develop-
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because of the essentiality and complexity of the obviousness deter-
mination and because of the fundamental human susceptibility to 
hindsight bias, providing the decision maker with a more robust ana-
lytical framework is critical. 
1. The First One Hundred Years of the Nonobviousness 
Requirement 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the nonobviousness requirement for 
patentability is the result of a long and indirect development process.  
Unlike the requirements of novelty and utility, obviousness was only 
incorporated as a statutory requirement after its articulation by the 
Supreme Court.
18
  In early patent jurisprudence, the word “inven-
tion” was sometimes read to encompass the idea of “nonobvious-
ness,” which the Supreme Court first explicitly recognized as an addi-
tional requirement for patentability in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood.
19
  After 
one hundred years of relying on the Hotchkiss precedent as the basis 
of the nonobviousness requirement, the 1952 Patent Act codified the 
first statutory embodiment of the inventiveness or nonobviousness 
requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 103.20  Section 103 replaced the less-
definite “invention” language of Hotchkiss with the more operative 
idea of “nonobviousness” in the hope of increasing uniformity and 
definiteness.
21
  Cases following the enactment of § 103 have elabo-
rated on the nonobviousness requirement in various ways, but the 
general concept has remained the same: “[T]he subject matter as a 
whole [cannot] have been obvious at the time the invention was 
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject 
matter pertains.”22  The various modes of interpreting this basic re-
quirement throughout the history of its development provide helpful 
building blocks for a more robust post-KSR analytical framework. 
 
ments are sufficient to overcome the inherent hindsight bias observed in the ob-
viousness inquiry.  Id. at 27. 
 18 See supra note 9 and accompanying text; infra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 19 52 U.S. 248 (1851).  The Court stated that “unless more ingenuity and skill . . . 
than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic” were required to arrive at the im-
proved product, “there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which 
constitute essential elements of every invention”; the discovered improvement was 
thus “the work of the skilful [sic] mechanic, not that of the inventor.”  Id. at 267.  See 
generally 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §§ 5.02–.02[1] (perm. ed., rev. 
2007). 
 20 Patent (Bryson) Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (codified as amended at 
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006)). 
 21 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1966). 
 22 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). 
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Prior to the enactment of § 103 and to its case-law progeny, 
courts had long struggled with the Hotchkiss “invention” requirement, 
and various courts dealt with it in different ways.  Of particular note 
are the objective factual circumstances that a number of courts em-
ployed to evaluate obviousness, especially the emphasis on evidence 
of long-felt yet unmet need and the failure of others.
23
  During this 
period, Judge Learned Hand was one of the best-remembered, if not 
strongest, proponents of the use of “objective factors” in the obvious-
ness determination.
24
  Judge Hand adopted a comprehensive view of 
objective evidence and emphasized it as a vital part of the inquiry: 
 In dealing with the issue of invention, we have tried, so far as 
possible, to rely upon objective factors in preference to our a pri-
ori judgment . . . .  [W]e look to the length of time during which 
the incentive existed to contrive the invention, to the number of 
unsuccessful efforts that were made in that period, to the densi-
ty—so to speak—of those efforts at about the time when the in-
vention was made, to whether success came independently to sev-
eral inventors at about the same time, and to the extent to which 
after the invention appeared, it supplanted what had gone be-
fore.
25
 
This examination of objective evidence of nonobviousness was critical 
both to the jurisprudence of the pre-section 103 era and to the future 
development of so-called “secondary considerations.” 
2. The Introduction of the Graham Framework 
Shortly after the enactment of § 103, the Supreme Court devel-
oped a framework for applying the new statutory nonobviousness re-
quirement to the facts of particular cases in Graham v. John Deere Co.
26
  
In Graham, the Court declared that, although patent validity is ulti-
mately a question of law, the obviousness determination relies on sev-
eral underlying factual inquiries.
27
  The Court set out a four-prong 
framework for the obviousness analysis: (1) examine the scope and 
content of the prior art; (2) determine the differences between the 
 
 23 See Joseph Scott Miller, Level of Skill and Long-Felt Need: Notes on a Forgotten Fu-
ture, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 579, 586 (2008) (compiling these cases). 
 24 Id.; see also Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 155 F.2d 937, 
939 (2d Cir. 1946) (emphasizing the importance of these factors); 2 CHISUM, supra 
note 19, § 5.05, at 5-639 (summarizing Judge Hand’s views). 
 25 Clark v. Wright Aeronautical Corp., 162 F.2d 960, 966 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 26 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966); see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 
406–07 (2007) (discussing the role of the Graham decision in the obviousness in-
quiry). 
 27 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. 
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prior art and the claims under consideration; (3) evaluate the level of 
ordinary skill in the art; and (4) when appropriate, look to secondary 
considerations, such as commercial success, long-felt but unmet 
needs, and the failure of others.
28
  Since that time, the Graham 
framework has been fundamental to the obviousness determination, 
and its importance was reaffirmed in KSR.
29
  Notably, the decision on 
its face appears to “demote” objective evidence of nonobviousness, 
which was frequently considered critical in earlier decisions,
30
 to a tru-
ly secondary position. 
The Graham framework can be divided into two evidential cate-
gories.  The first relates to the knowledge and ingenuity of the 
PHOSITA at the time of invention, and the second relates to the 
teachings of secondary considerations about the obviousness of the 
invention at that time.  The relative importance of these two types of 
evidence has been debated, however, and it has received various 
treatments by the courts.
31
  Secondary considerations have been re-
garded alternately to be mere scale-tippers
32
 or to be the only safe ba-
sis for decision,
33
 and this observation illustrates the greatest problem 
with the Graham framework—its failure to provide any tools for mea-
surement within the framework.  While Graham instructs courts how 
to approach the obviousness problem by outlining which questions to 
ask, it fails to specify how courts should interpret the answers to those 
questions—that is, the degree of “inventiveness” that is required for 
patentability. 
3. The Appearance of the Teaching-Suggestion-
Motivation Test 
Responding to this “Graham gap,” the Federal Circuit began to 
emphasize a supplementary obviousness test, known as the “teaching-
 
 28 Id. at 17–18. 
 29 KSR, 550 U.S. at 407 (“[T]he factors continue to define the inquiry that con-
trols.”). 
 30 See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
 31 Amanda Wieker, Secondary Considerations Should Be Given Increased Weight in Ob-
viousness Inquiries Under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in the Post-KSR v. Teleflex World, 17 FED. CIR. 
B.J. 665, 674 (2008) (discussing the role of secondary considerations before and after 
KSR). 
 32 Graham, 383 U.S. at 36 (finding that evidence of long-felt but unmet need and 
of commercial success did “not, in the circumstances of this case, tip the scales of pa-
tentability”). 
 33 See, e.g., Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consol. Rubber Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 437, 
441–45 (1911) (relying almost exclusively on what would now be called secondary 
considerations in finding patent validity). 
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suggestion-motivation” (TSM) test, to flesh out the framework.34  The 
TSM test addressed the issue of the obviousness of combinations of 
elements previously known in the prior art,
35
 which is an area of par-
ticular importance because “[m]ost if not all inventions arise from a 
combination of old elements.”36  The basic premise of the TSM test—
a combination invention is not obvious unless the prior art, the na-
ture of the problem, or the skill of the PHOSITA suggested a combi-
nation of prior-art elements
37—developed in conjunction with other 
early obviousness doctrines in the Supreme Court, courts of appeals, 
and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Federal Circuit’s 
predecessor court.
38
  Thus, although the Federal Circuit was later crit-
icized for its reliance on the TSM test,
39
 the test itself was a creature of 
extended historical development, like the nonobviousness require-
ment itself. 
In the years following the Graham decision and the creation of 
the Federal Circuit, the Federal Circuit did indeed usher in an era of 
more well-defined and rigorous use of the TSM test.
40
  But as the TSM 
test flourished, some began to complain that the test was too rigid 
and resulted in findings of nonobviousness for what were actually 
 
 34 See, e.g., Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(“The party seeking patent invalidity based on obviousness must also show some mo-
tivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings.  A suggestion or motivation 
to combine generally arises in the references themselves, but may also be inferred 
from the nature of the problem or occasionally from the knowledge of those of ordi-
nary skill in the art.”) (citations omitted). 
 35 See id.  
 36 In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 37 The TSM test first appears in In re Bergel, 292 F.2d 955, 956–57 (C.C.P.A. 1961) 
(“The mere fact that it is possible to find two isolated disclosures which might be 
combined in such a way to produce a new compound does not necessarily render 
such production obvious unless the art also contains something to suggest the desi-
rability of the proposed combination.”). 
 38 See, e.g., Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 161 (1892) (discussing the relationship 
between the nature of the problem, the knowledge of the PHOSITA, and obvious-
ness); In re Adams, 356 F.2d 998, 1002 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (“Of course all of the refer-
ences may be used to show what the art knew, and in that sense ‘combined’ but the 
fact remains that neither reference contains the slightest suggestion to use what it 
discloses in combination with what is disclosed in the other.”); In re Huntzicker, 90 
F.2d 366, 368–69 (C.C.P.A. 1937) (“We find nothing in the references to suggest that 
appellant’s new, useful, and commercially successful device might be constructed by 
combining some of their elements.  We are of [the] opinion, therefore, that the ap-
pealed claims involve invention and are patentable.”). 
 39 A famous, and very damaging, criticism of the TSM test as applied by the Fed-
eral Circuit is of course the Supreme Court’s KSR decision.  See KSR Int’l Co. v. Telef-
lex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 40 See, e.g., In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 
994 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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unpatentable improvements.
41
  For example, a rigid application of 
the TSM test frequently resulted in the requirement of an explicit 
teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine elements in the prior-
art publication itself, and without such an explicit hint, the combina-
tion was found to be nonobvious.
42
  Critics railed against “rigid pre-
ventative rules that deny fact-finders recourse to common sense”43 
and the death of obviousness.
44
  While this revolt against the TSM test 
may be well deserved, courts must be careful not to “throw the baby 
out with the bathwater.”45 
4. The KSR Decision 
In KSR, the Supreme Court called for a return to the founda-
tions laid in Graham as the primary framework for understanding the 
nonobviousness requirement and finally dismissed the narrow appli-
cation of the TSM test.
46
  The Supreme Court chastised the Federal 
Circuit for its “rigid” approach and cited the Court’s own history of 
an “expansive and flexible” approach to the obviousness inquiry.47  
Rather than look to a teaching, suggestion, or motivation in “pub-
lished articles and the explicit content of issued patents,”48 the Court 
identified the three primary factors that urged the combination: the 
nature of the problem,
49
 perceived market demand,
50
 and common 
sense.
51
 
 
 41 See, e.g., KSR, 550 U.S. at 418–19. 
 42 See, e.g., Brief for Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioner, KSR, 550 U.S. 398 (No. 04-1350) (arguing against this rigid appli-
cation). 
 43 KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. 
 44 McEldowney, supra note 13, ¶ 2. 
 45 This phrase comes from the German expression meaning “to reject the essen-
tial with the inessential, to discard what is valuable along with what is waste or use-
less.”  1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 851 (2d ed. 1989). 
 46 KSR, 550 U.S. 398. 
 47 Id. at 415. 
 48 Id. at 419.  Speaking directly to the TSM test, the Court stated that the ob-
viousness analysis “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific sub-
ject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences 
and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.”  Id. at 418. 
 49 Id. at 419–20 (“One of the ways in which a patent’s subject matter can be 
proved obvious is by noting that there existed at the time of invention a known prob-
lem for which there was an obvious solution encompassed by the patent’s claims.”). 
 50 Id. at 417 (“When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives 
and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a dif-
ferent one.”). 
 51 The Court reasoned that the person of ordinary skill has sufficient motivation 
to pursue a finite number of predictable, feasible solutions to a known design need 
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Specifically, the KSR decision related to the obviousness of a pa-
tent in the mechanical arts—a combination of an electronic sensor 
and an adjustable automobile pedal such that the pedal’s position 
can be ascertained for computerized throttle control.
52
  Because both 
adjustable pedals and electronic sensors for computer-controlled 
throttles were known in the prior art,
53
 the validity of the patent 
turned on the obviousness of the combination.  Regarding this com-
bination, the Court explained, “Common sense teaches . . . that fa-
miliar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, 
and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the 
teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.”54  If 
the combination of known options is successful, the invention “is like-
ly the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common 
sense.”55 
In relying on a common sense approach, however, the Court 
failed to make an important distinction between the application of an 
intuitive or “ordinary” understanding of the problem when attempt-
ing the combination and its application when determining the 
PHOSITA’s expectation of success.56  Applying common sense to ap-
preciate the likelihood of attempting the combination reveals wheth-
er the combination is “obvious to try,” whereas applying common 
sense to appreciate the a priori expectation of the combination’s suc-
cess reveals whether the combination embodies the inventive step re-
quired for patentability.
57
  The Court glosses over this distinction and, 
thus, suggests that where the invention is the product “of ordinary 
 
or market pressure.  Id. at 421.  “If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the 
product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense.  In that instance 
the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under § 
103.”  Id. 
 52 KSR, 550 U.S. at 405–06. 
 53 Id. at 408–09. 
 54 Id. at 420. 
 55 Id. at 421. 
 56 A court requires a reasonable expectation of success of the combination inven-
tion to find the combination to be obvious.  See, e.g., In re Dow Chem. Co., 837 F.2d 
469, 473 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  Patent application examination rules also reflect this re-
quirement.  See PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 2143.02 (6th ed. 2007). 
 57 Courts have distinguished the obviousness of the attempted combination (re-
ferred to as “obvious to try”) from the obviousness of the invention itself.  See, e.g., 
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1207–08 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  The 
expectation of success is also legally distinct from the “inherency” or inevitability of 
success.  See, e.g., In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1054 (C.C.P.A. 1976). 
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skill and common sense,” it is both obvious to try and lacking an in-
ventive step.
58
 
Throughout this analysis, the Court directed little attention to 
the evaluation of secondary considerations, a matter that has tradi-
tionally demanded attention in the obviousness inquiry.  In reference 
to this objective evidence, the Court only stated, “Like the District 
Court, finally, we conclude Teleflex has shown no secondary factors 
to dislodge the determination that [the claim] is obvious.”59  Clearly, 
the Court considered the secondary-consideration evidence to be tru-
ly “secondary” in the analysis—useful only to the extent that it was 
necessary as a tiebreaker—or the issue would not have received such 
perfunctory treatment.  In this way, the Court neglected to look to an 
indicator of nonobviousness, the development of which has been in-
tertwined with the development of the nonobviousness requirement 
itself.  Instead, the Court relied on “common sense,” without being 
specific as to exactly whose common sense served as the benchmark, 
and thus found the invention at issue in KSR to be an obvious combi-
nation of prior-art elements without any substantive analysis of the 
objective evidence. 
The KSR decision must be evaluated both in the context of its 
particular facts and with a view as to how subsequent cases will apply 
its jurisprudential basis.  At the factual level, the Court probably 
reached the correct result; had the Court more carefully and explicit-
ly detailed its analytical steps, the outcome would probably not be al-
tered.  With respect to the analytical methodology in KSR, one favor-
able outcome is that the less rigid approach to the obviousness 
inquiry likely better reflects reality.  The Court was clearly correct 
when stating that “[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of or-
dinary creativity, not an automaton,”60 and it is likewise true that a 
motivation to combine elements can exist in the prior art or the mind 
of the PHOSITA without need for the explicit teaching sometimes 
required under the TSM test.  Furthermore, KSR has opened the way 
for alternative interpretations or standards for the obviousness de-
termination; the undercutting of the TSM test wipes the slate clean 
for a new but flexible approach to develop to fill the “Graham gap.” 
What KSR gives with one hand, however, it takes away with the 
other.  The particular factual setting in the mechanical arts domi-
nates the Court’s analysis.  Reliance on nothing more than the 
 
 58 KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. 
 59 Id. at 426. 
 60 Id. at 421. 
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“common sense” of the PHOSITA as a benchmark may not be ap-
propriate in other contexts, particularly in highly complex industries 
where the application of concepts of “common sense” and “ordinary” 
by fact finders possessing different varieties of common sense is illog-
ical.  Therefore, while those not skilled in the mechanical arts
61
 can 
readily envision a brake pedal, an electronic sensor, and their combi-
nation, the same is not true for many other areas of technology.  
Comfort with a rationale that relies on “common sense” is thus ex-
tremely limited.
62
  Furthermore, the Court implied a questionable use 
of this common-sense approach by seeming to suggest that a simple 
motivation to combine, found anywhere, is sufficient to find an in-
vention obvious regardless of the likely results of the combination.  A 
more satisfying analysis would rely on an acknowledgment that the 
mechanical arts in many respects are now so well developed and un-
derstood—easily comprehensible even by lay people—that the cer-
tainty of the outcome elevates “obvious to try” to obviousness itself. 
In addition to this doctrinal confusion, the analysis required un-
der the Graham framework itself was weak.  For example, the Court, 
relying on a résumé-type description, provided only perfunctory iden-
tification of the PHOSITA: “[T]he level of ordinary skill in pedal de-
sign was an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering (or an 
equivalent amount of industry experience) [and] familiarity with 
pedal control systems for vehicles.”63  This describes what the 
PHOSITA knows but not any degree of ingenuity.  What does the 
PHOSITA do with this knowledge?  The Court also gave short shrift 
to the objective evidence incorporated in Graham’s secondary consid-
erations.
64
  The Court passed up an opportunity to clarify the role 
these considerations play beyond the particular facts of the KSR 
case—as scale-tippers or as definitive evidence—by adopting the low-
er court’s determination without further discussion.65  Consequently, 
by reverting to a pure Graham analysis, the Court failed to improve 
upon the obviousness doctrine and instead simply returned to the 
 
 61 These persons may include, presumably, members of the Supreme Court. 
 62 According to the Supreme Court, secondary considerations are useful for pre-
cisely this reason: “[t]hese legal inferences or subtests do focus attention on econom-
ic and motivational rather than technical issues and are, therefore, more susceptible 
of judicial treatment than are the highly technical facts often present in patent litiga-
tion.”  Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1966). 
 63 KSR, 550 U.S. 412–13 (internal quotations omitted). 
 64 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 65 KSR, 550 U.S. at 426. 
GEERS (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2010  1:15 PM 
2010] COMMENT 237 
pre-TSM state of uncertainty.  The Court justifiably reduced one doc-
trine but did not provide anything in its place. 
KSR has thus opened the way for greater flexibility in the ob-
viousness determination.  Yet as a result, the doctrine is still lacking in 
several respects.  Courts now lack a judicially manageable standard 
for determining obviousness.  While the Graham framework continues 
to teach courts how to approach the inquiry, it does not suggest how 
to analyze the factual results thus obtained to arrive at the requisite 
level of inventiveness, a legal determination.  That is, the Graham 
analysis still does not explain how to tell if an invention is inventive 
enough.  Likewise, although the use of common sense is generally 
admirable, especially when that use is by an acceptably knowledgea-
ble source, “obvious to try” still should not be a substitute for a prop-
er obviousness analysis in the absence of conditions suggesting that 
any obvious attempt will lead to an equally unquestionable success.  
The KSR decision also fails to address the issue of hindsight bias, 
which the TSM test was at least partially created to mitigate.
66
  While 
the Court pays lip service to the reality of hindsight bias, the Court 
does not offer any alternative protection or even appear to consider 
the issue seriously.
67
  The failure of the KSR analysis in these respects 
results in greater doctrinal uncertainty, particularly outside the me-
chanical context, which in turn creates a disincentive for the inven-
tors who now have fewer tools to gauge the validity of any patents 
they have or seek.  In particular, a greater risk of loss of patent pro-
tection may cause resource-intensive industries to forego some re-
search and development activities to avoid any expectation of losses. 
In sum, the Court in KSR properly returned significant flexibility 
to the obviousness analysis by rejecting the rigidity of the TSM test.  
The Court failed, however, to provide a new analytical framework for 
future determinations to supplement the “Graham gap” in the mea-
surement of inventiveness.  Because of the particular factual circums-
tances of the invention, the Court also failed to explicitly address 
other critical aspects of the obviousness doctrine.  The failure to spell 
out analytical steps in addressing secondary considerations and the 
degree of ingenuity of the PHOSITA leaves the role of these factors 
 
 66 Supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 67 See KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 (“A factfinder should be aware, of course, of the dis-
tortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex 
post reasoning. . . .  Rigid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to com-
mon sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with 
it.”). 
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in question.  These concepts merit new roles in tailoring the Graham 
inquiry. 
B. The Evolution of Obviousness Includes the Advent of Technology 
Specificity within the “Neutral” Patent Framework 
Before plunging into a revised theoretical framework for the ob-
viousness determination, it is important to understand the goals en-
shrined in the patent bargain and the needs of patent-utilizing indus-
tries.  That is, to comprehend the current importance of the 
obviousness doctrine, especially the importance of achieving success 
with respect to various industries, understanding its context generally 
within patent law is helpful.  Only by keeping the fundamental goals 
and purposes of the patent system in mind can the propriety of its 
treatment of various industries—the most important benchmark for 
the success of the framework—be evaluated. 
1. The Societal Bargain Embodied in the Patent System 
Patents are a government-sponsored monopoly created to pro-
vide an incentive for innovation and technology development by re-
warding meritorious inventions with a significant period of market-
place exclusivity.
68
  Without proper profit incentives created by the 
possibility of monopoly, many inventors would forego expensive re-
search and development investments because of the risk of irrecover-
able losses.
69
  For example, without any restriction on competition, 
inventions that are costly to develop but cheap to copy would be ra-
pidly mimicked in the marketplace and would result in one party 
bearing research costs while reaping only a portion of the profits.
70
  
 
 68 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730–31 
(2002); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 167 
(1989) (describing the federal patent law as a “careful balance between public right 
and private monopoly to promote certain creative activity”). 
 69 See, e.g., Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The 
encouragement of investment-based risk is the fundamental purpose of the patent 
grant, and is based directly on the right to exclude.”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO 
PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY Executive Summary, at 2 (2003), available at www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/ 
innovationrpt.pdf (“This property right can enable firms to increase their expected 
profits from investments in research and development, thus fostering innovation that 
would not occur but for the prospect of a patent.”). 
 70 Profitability will depend on what is known as the “first-mover advantage”: “In-
vestment in innovation is driven by expectations of transitory monopoly returns that 
innovations are supposed to yield.  There have always been two strategies to protect-
ing these monopoly returns.  The first relies on patents, the second on developing 
innovations in secrecy and getting to the market first.”  Rajshree Agarwal & Michael 
Gort, First-Mover Advantage and the Speed of Competitive Entry, 1887–1986, 44 J.L. & 
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This phenomenon is particularly evident in some industries, such as 
those where research and development cycles are more lengthy or re-
source intensive.
71
 
In exchange for this limited patent monopoly, the public bene-
fits from the required disclosure of the details of the patentee’s in-
vention, which increases the store of public knowledge and promotes 
further advances.
72
  Additionally, at the end of the monopoly period, 
the invention is entirely dedicated to the public.
73
  In that respect, the 
patent system represents a “bargain” between the inventor and socie-
ty.
74
 
Over-extending patent protection to inventions that do not truly 
represent scientific or technological advances risks the public paying 
a premium for knowledge already in the public store or for inven-
tions that only represent a trivial improvement over what is already 
available.
75
  In theory, the patentability of an invention should reflect 
a reality that it would not have been financially practical to develop 
the invention but for the incentive of a patent.
76
  The nonobviousness 
 
ECON. 161, 161 (2001); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 69, ch. 2, at 4 (discuss-
ing the problem of so-called “free riders” as a disincentive to innovate). 
 71 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 69, ch. 2, at 4; see id. ch. 3, at 9 (discussing the 
importance of patent rights to prevent free riding in the pharmaceutical industry, 
where patents are “essential” to recouping “significant investments in research and 
development”). 
 72 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–51 (1989) 
(“The federal patent system thus embodies a carefully crafted bargain for encourag-
ing the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances in technol-
ogy and design in return for the exclusive right to practice the invention for a period 
of years.”). 
 73 Id. at 151 (“[U]pon expiration of that period, the knowledge of the invention 
inures to the people . . . .”). 
 74 Id. 
 75 “As we refrain from granting patents on inventions that are not new, we must 
also refrain from granting patents on those inventions which would arise spontaneous-
ly, given the need or desire for them, as the yelp of the dog surely follows from step-
ping on his tail . . . .”  Giles S. Rich, Assoc. Judge, U.S. Court of Customs & Patent 
Appeals, Acceptance Speech for the 1963 Kettering Award at the George Washington 
University: The Vague Concept of “Invention” as Replaced by Sec. 103 of the 1952 
Patent Act (June 18, 1964), in 46 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 855, 859 (1964). 
 76 See id.; Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966) (describing the “inhe-
rent problem” of creating patentability standards as that of “develop[ing] some 
means of weeding out those inventions which would not be disclosed or devised but 
for the inducement of a patent”); supra note 69 and accompanying text.  In an inter-
esting piece of scholarship arguing for the resurrection of the TSM test after KSR, 
Randall Hirsch asserts that the obviousness determination turns on the subjective 
measure of a discovery’s “inventiveness” only because a more objective measure of 
sufficient societal benefit is not practicable.  Randall J. Hirsch, Comment, Well Duh: 
Obviousness, Gas Pedals, and the Teaching-Suggestion-Motivation Test, 6 NW. J. TECH. & 
GEERS (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2010  1:15 PM 
240 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:225 
requirement plays a role in policing the granting of patents by ensur-
ing that the system is not overinclusive in its protection and by pro-
viding the theoretical flexibility that the novelty and utility require-
ments for patentability cannot. 
2. The Effect of Emergent Technologies on Both the 
Patent Bargain and Industrial Neutrality 
These fundamental goals and the public-private exchange em-
bodied in the U.S. patent system have remained relatively unchanged 
since its inception.  But with the advent of the “digital revolution,” 
patent protection is particularly important to promote and protect 
the efforts of inventors in emerging industries.
77
  U.S. patent law has 
thus evolved to face the challenges that a myriad of new and advanc-
ing technologies has presented.  In particular, although Congress has 
responded with some statutory changes, most notably the § 103 non-
obviousness requirement, a general reluctance to address these new 
technology developments statutorily has remained.
78
  The changes 
that most clearly respond to industrial and technological develop-
ments—many of which were inconceivable at the creation of the pa-
tent system
79—occurred in the federal courts, which have tackled 
these challenges by developing new judicial doctrines and analytical 
frameworks in a nearly constant state of flux.
80
  This tension between 
legislative and judicial action—between the need to adjust quickly to 
evolving technology and the need to have an equitable impact across 
 
INTELL. PROP. 89, 91–92 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/njtip/v6 
/n1/5/Hirsch.pdf. 
 77 For an interesting study of the impact of recent technology changes on patent 
applicant prosecution practice, see John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing 
Complexity of the United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77 (2002). 
 78 Brian Kahin, Patents and Diversity in Innovation, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. 
REV. 389, 391 (2007) (questioning this reluctance throughout the patent system and 
the resulting “one size fits all” approach).  Congress is also limited in its ability to en-
gage in direct statutory tailoring by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPS) requirement that patent rights be enjoyable “with-
out discrimination as to . . . the field of technology.”  Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the 
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm.  
 79 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1159 (2002) (comparing the “homogenous” mechanical 
inventions at the time of the Framers with the current diversity of patent law). 
 80 See generally id. (arguing that patent law is becoming increasingly technology 
specific because of the federal courts’ reliance on “an ad hoc combination of judicial 
anthropology and stare decisis”). 
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various industries—presents a unique challenge in promoting the pa-
tent system’s underlying goals across various industries. 
On the one hand, patent statutes and regulations are facially 
neutral with respect to arts and industries.  The patent system does 
not differentiate between types of inventions and is considered 
“technology-neutral.”81  Patent statutes and regulations related to pa-
tentability do not reflect any of the differences that might exist be-
tween the circumstances and needs of various industries, and they 
generally are inappropriate vehicles for addressing the ever-changing 
issues of fast-paced technological development.
82
 
On the other hand, as courts have interpreted the statutory pa-
tentability requirements on the particular facts of various industry-
specific cases, this “neutral” system has been flexed in response to the 
realities of the inventive process and marketplace competition of var-
ious industries.
83
  The true problem with this facially neutral but prac-
tically biased system is the failure of the courts to recognize their role 
in the development of industry-specific doctrine and the impact their 
decisions have beyond the cases and facts at hand. 
3. Recognizing Diverse Innovation Environments Across 
Industries 
Different industries clearly have different needs: 
A wealth of empirical evidence demonstrates deep structural dif-
ferences in how industries innovate.  Industries vary in the speed 
and cost of research and development (“R&D”), in the ease with 
which inventions can be imitated by others, in the need for cumu-
lative or interoperative innovation rather than stand-alone devel-
opment, and in the extent to which patents cover entire products 
or merely components of products.
84
 
For example, the pharmaceutical and biotech industries require 
extensive and costly research to put a product on the market; a risky 
hit-or-miss discovery process is coupled with extensive regulatory con-
 
 81 Id. at 1158. 
 82 Kahin, supra note 78, at 393 (“It now appears that the extraordinary difficulty 
of trying to reform a monolithic system means that legislative reform will be unable 
to keep pace with problems as they develop.”); see also Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property 
Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 841–42 
(1999). 
 83 Burk & Lemley, supra note 79, at 1156 (“Of late, however, we have noticed an 
increasing divergence between the rules themselves and the application of the rules 
to different industries.”). 
 84 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 
1577 (2003). 
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trol of marketing.
85
  The life sciences industry generally needs a sig-
nificant monopoly period to recoup investment and maintain profit-
ability.
86
  In contrast, software and electronics industries have relative-
ly short product life cycles; product development and generational 
replacement are comparatively rapid.
87
  In the case of software, devel-
opment is generally not as highly human-resource or capital inten-
sive.
88
  With these two industries constituting the most active areas of 
patenting activity,
89
 the adaptation of patent law to secure its goals 
with respect to both industries seems a legitimate objective. 
At present, the most unsettling aspect of this adaptation process 
is that industry-specific patentability standards have already emerged 
without a clear intention to create new doctrine.
90
  In a series of scho-
larship, Professors Dan Burke and Mark Lemley have explored the 
 
 85 For example, “the average cost of developing a new medicine [is] $1.3 billion . 
. . including the cost of failures and capital,” and “the R&D process takes an average 
of 10 to 15 years.”  PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
PROFILE 2008, at 2, 3 (2008), available at http://www.phrma.org/files/ 
2008%20Profile.pdf.   
 86 Burk & Lemley, supra note 84, at 1581–83. 
 87 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 69, ch. 3, at 45 (“[T]he rate of technological 
change in the software and Internet industries is rapid.  Imitation may occur quickly, 
and entire product life cycles sometimes pass before patents can be issued.”).  This 
may be due in part to Moore’s Law, which states that the number of transistors on a 
chip will double every two years, correlating to a doubling of computer performance 
every eighteen months.  E.g., Michael Kanellos, Moore’s Law to Roll on for Another Dec-
ade, CNET NEWS, Feb. 10, 2003, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1001-984051.html 
(quoting Intel cofounder Gordon Moore as projecting that his Moore’s Law would 
apply for at least another decade).  
 88 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 69, ch. 3, at 45 (“[I]nnovation in the software 
and Internet industries generally requires considerably less capital than innovation 
in other high-tech industries.”); Burk & Lemley, supra note 84, at 1582 (“In the com-
puter industry, for example, it has long been possible for two programmers working 
in a garage to develop a commercial software program.”). 
 89 The following were the ten most frequently patented technology divisions in 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) in 2006: (1) Active Solid-State De-
vices; (2) Semiconductor Device Manufacturing: Process; (3) Multiplex Communica-
tions; (4) Telecommunications; (5) Chemistry: Molecular Biology and Microbiology; 
(6) Electrical Computers and Digital Processing Systems: Multicomputer Data Trans-
ferring; (7) Drug, Bio-Affecting and Body Treating Compositions; (8) Computer 
Graphics Processing and Selective Visual Display Systems; (9) Pulse or Digital Com-
munications; and (10) Communications: Electrical.  Patent Tech. Monitoring Team 
(PTMT), U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Counts by Class by Year: 
01/01/1977–12/31/2008, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/ 
cbcby.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2010). 
 90 Burk & Lemley, supra note 79, at 1205 (“Patent law is becoming technology-
specific. The legal rules applied to biotechnology cases bear less and less resem-
blance to those applied in software cases. While there may be good policy reasons to 
treat the two industries differently, the current legal rules are . . . an ad hoc combina-
tion of judicial anthropology and stare decisis.”). 
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emerging issue of technology specificity and found that “in the indus-
tries of biotechnology and software . . . the Federal Circuit has gotten 
the policy precisely backwards, perhaps because it is not making in-
dustry-specific patent policy intentionally.”91  The resulting disparity 
in treatment among industries does not accurately reflect needs and 
upsets the balance between promoting innovation and promoting 
public disclosure, the twin aims of the patent system.
92
  On one hand, 
if patentability standards are overinclusive (i.e., if patents that do not 
represent true invention steps are granted), incentives to the paten-
tee are increased, but the public pays in the form of monopoly prices 
for inventions that were either already available in the public domain 
or represent trivial improvements.  On the other hand, if patentabili-
ty standards are underinclusive (i.e., if patents are denied to true in-
ventive steps), the public benefits in the short term by receiving the 
fruits of the invention at a reduced price, but the long-term incentive 
available to the inventor is diminished.  Thus, maintaining the proper 
balance is crucial.  Although building flexibility into the system to ac-
count for the disparities in the inventive environment across indus-
tries is desirable, the development of industry-specific jurisprudence 
in an ad hoc or unintentional manner (as appears to be the case) 
may frustrate the patent system’s fundamental purpose. 
In light of both the danger of this ad hoc, one-off approach and 
the opportunity for rethinking the obviousness inquiry that KSR 
represents, federal courts should now attempt to harmonize the ob-
viousness doctrine to better address different industries’ needs and 
the realities of their invention environments. 
C. The Case for Technology-Specific Obviousness Considerations Is 
Strong 
The increased flexibility in the obviousness doctrine since KSR 
opens the door for the Federal Circuit to develop an industry-specific 
approach to properly and thoughtfully address the various needs and 
circumstances of patent-dependent industries.  The reinvention of 
several key obviousness concepts can create manageable standards 
and address industry-specificity without requiring statutory de-
 
 91 Burk & Lemley, supra note 84, at 1578.  
 92 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 79, at 1205–06; see also BD. ON SCI., TECH., & 
ECON. POLICY, POLICY & GLOBAL AFFAIRS DIV., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L 
ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 35–41 (Steven A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004), 
available at http://books.nap.edu/html/patentsystem/0309089107.pdf (describing 
the industry-specific costs and disparate benefits of the current patent system as one 
of several reasons the system requires re-examination). 
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neutralization.  First, by reconsidering the Graham analysis, courts can 
utilize the “secondary considerations” (objective evidence) of each 
industry to inform the characterization of the PHOSITA.  Rather 
than consider this evidence to be “secondary” in time or importance, 
objective evidence can answer the question of how the PHOSITA uses 
prior-art knowledge.  Second, by properly identifying and under-
standing the proper objective factors, the courts can establish an ana-
lytical framework to lend consistency and predictability to obvious-
ness determinations.  This stability in turn strengthens the incentive 
to innovate.  Furthermore, by agreeing on which factors are impor-
tant, fact finders can use evidence that does not depend entirely on 
retrospective analysis to fill the hole left by the apparent demise of 
the TSM test.  Such determinations in turn may rely exclusively on 
the prior art to bridge the gap between the fact finder’s “common 
sense” and the PHOSITA’s inherent inventiveness.  Third and finally, 
by viewing the inventions of each industry through this obviousness 
analytical framework—trusting objective evidence particular to each 
industry or art rather than previous ad hoc judicial determinations—
the proper result is achieved for each industry. 
III. OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE IS THE BEST INDICATOR OF OBVIOUSNESS 
AND THE NEEDS OF INDUSTRY 
A. Who is the PHOSITA? 
Under the Graham framework, the PHOSITA is the yardstick 
against which fact finders measure all inventions.
93
  But who is this 
critical “person”?  Graham teaches that the court will look to the 
scope and content of the prior art, differences between the prior art 
and the claims, and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
94
  
Related to each of these three steps, the PHOSITA embodies the lev-
el of ordinary skill and knows the entire contents of the prior art at 
the time of the invention.
95
  Thus, the PHOSITA is a legal construct 
who is not equivalent to the inventor.
96
  Keeping this in mind is critical 
 
 93 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). 
 94 Id.  
 95 “The legal construct also presumes that all prior art references in the field of 
the invention are available to this hypothetical skilled artisan.”  In re Rouffet, 149 
F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 
745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he real meaning of ‘prior art’ in legal 
theory . . . is knowledge that is available, including what would be obvious from it, at 
a given time, to a person of ordinary skill in an art.”). 
 96 “This legal construct is akin to the ‘reasonable person’ used as a reference in 
negligence determinations.”  In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d at 1357. 
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because obviousness is determined from the baseline of the 
PHOSITA (an objective perspective), not from the baseline of the in-
ventor (a subjective perspective).  If the inventiveness of the putative 
inventor extends beyond the capability of the PHOSITA for the in-
vention at issue, it is considered nonobvious.
97
  At this point the ana-
lytical framework falters.  Because of the “Graham gap,” no clear 
yardstick exists with which to compare this level of ordinary skill to 
the skill presented by the inventor.
98
  While Graham requires the 
comparison, it does not teach what level of inventive step is nontrivial 
and nonobvious.
99
 
1. The Traditional Understanding of the PHOSITA 
Unfortunately, the traditional definition of the PHOSITA and 
the related extent of factual inquiry elaborated in court decisions do 
not help fill this gap.  Currently, the factual inquiry yields only (1) 
the field of the PHOSITA’s knowledge (her position in the field of 
related academic work), (2) the PHOSITA’s educational background 
and curriculum vitae experience, and (3) the tools with which the 
PHOSITA works (the relevant prior art).
100
  This type of inquiry does 
not illuminate what use the PHOSITA makes of this background or 
what degree of inventiveness or innovation the PHOSITA possesses.  
Although previous decisions do an excellent job of describing in de-
tail the art “known” by the theoretical PHOSITA, these same deci-
sions rely on conclusory statements about the PHOSITA’s motiva-
tions or acts in using this knowledge.  For example, in the Graham 
decision itself, after extensive discussion of the background of the pa-
tent and prior art, the Court simply states, “Certainly a person having 
ordinary skill in the prior art, given the [mechanism of the improve-
ment], would immediately see that the thing to do was what Graham 
 
 97 See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). 
 98 See supra Part II.A. 
 99 For an argument that the TSM test was an appropriate approach to filling this 
gap, see Hirsch, supra note 76. 
 100 See AllVoice Computing PLC v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., 504 F.3d 1236, 1240 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“AllVoice’s counsel defined ‘a person of ordinary skill in the art’ in 
the context of this case as ‘someone who has a degree in computer science or some-
thing equivalent and 2–3 years experience programming in Windows.’”);  Pfizer, Inc. 
v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[A] person of ordinary skill in 
the art would have a bachelor’s degree in pharmaceutical science or analytical che-
mistry, and some experience in drugs and drug preparation.”); supra note 63 and 
accompanying text. 
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did.”101  Future obviousness pupils can only speculate how the Court 
achieved this insight into the PHOSITA so effortlessly. 
Yet courts are not without the ability to improve this PHOSITA 
analysis in both structure and transparency.  Particularly, many objec-
tive ex ante factors actually teach about the context in which the 
PHOSITA lives, what the PHOSITA knows, and how creative the 
PHOSITA is.  These factors can also help calculate the probability of 
discovery at a particular time in the art.  The actual artisan can thus 
be compared to this ex ante theoretical construct.  Similarly, to cor-
roborate the preceding primary analysis, objective ex post factors also 
address the degree to which the inventor rose above the theoretical 
PHOSITA’s circumstances to become truly inventive.  Together, this 
collection of factual considerations can be used to shed light both on 
the inherent degree of inventiveness of the PHOSITA in a particular 
field and on the degree of inventiveness actually displayed by the in-
ventor.  The results of a factual inquiry, not of additional hypothetical 
wanderings, become the yardstick against which inventiveness is 
measured. 
Accordingly, in addition to the prior-art analysis required in 
Graham, a number of fact-based indicia—particularly an updated 
analysis of secondary considerations—help to understand the 
PHOSITA.  Collectively these indicia demonstrate, via tangible evi-
dence that is intellectually accessible to fact finders regardless of 
technical sophistication, how the PHOSITA responds to the encoun-
tered prior art. 
2. The Primacy of Secondary Considerations 
Reinterpreted 
Secondary considerations, or Judge Hand’s “objective factors,” 
should not really be treated as secondary; while “secondary” can refer 
to being either second in time or second in importance, neither of 
these labels is appropriate.  Rather, consideration of such objective 
factual evidence should form a primary part of the determination of 
the level of ordinary skill in the art.  The Federal Circuit and its pre-
decessor have repeatedly reaffirmed the primacy of secondary-
consideration evidence by stating that it is “always to be considered, 
and accorded whatever weight it may have.”102  As evidence that is na-
 
 101 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 25 (1966). 
 102 In re Mageli, 470 F.2d 1380, 1383 (C.C.P.A. 1973); see also Stratoflex, Inc. v. 
Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538–39 (Fed. Cir. 1983).  The Stratoflex court stated,   
It is jurisprudentially inappropriate to disregard any relevant evidence 
on any issue in any case, patent cases included.  Thus evidence rising 
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turally relevant to the nonobviousness of the invention, it should not 
be ignored when it is available.
103
  Likewise, as evidence that is intui-
tively appealing and more susceptible to a “common sense” evalua-
tion than the frequently highly technical prior-art evidence, it serves 
to orient the fact finder in his Graham analysis of the PHOSITA.
104
  In 
addition to this benefit of intellectual accessibility, secondary consid-
erations deserve whatever weight they merit, like any relevant evi-
dence.  This evidence should not be “secondary” at all. 
A wealth of sources exists for mining potential secondary con-
siderations; to name but a few, such sources include the Supreme 
Court and the Graham decision itself (commercial success, long-felt 
but unsolved needs, failure of others),
105
 Federal Circuit decisions 
(copying, unexpected results and properties, licensing activity, and 
skepticism within the field),
106
 the insightful obviousness analyses of 
Judge Learned Hand (density of inventive efforts and simultaneous 
invention),
107
 and legal scholarship.
108
  Traditionally, these and similar 
sources have defined secondary considerations in such a way that they 
either do or do not exist in a particular case and thus require no 
more than a binary “yes or no” response that does little to enable a 
sophisticated analysis of degree. 
Recent scholarship has reshaped the form of the inquiry to re-
spond to the continuum of circumstances that can realistically appear 
 
out of the so-called ‘secondary considerations’ must always when 
present be considered en route to a determination of obviousness.  In-
deed, evidence of secondary considerations may often be the most 
probative and cogent evidence in the record. . . .  It is to be considered 
as part of all the evidence, not just when the decisionmaker remains in 
doubt after reviewing the art.   
Id. (citations omitted).  
 103 In re Palmer, 451 F.2d 1100, 1104 (C.C.P.A. 1971); see also In re Mageli, 470 F.2d 
at 1383 (“[E]vidence bearing on the facts is never of ‘no moment,’ is always to be 
considered, and accorded whatever weight it may have.”). 
 104 Supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 105 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (listing “[s]uch secondary 
considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, 
etc.”). 
 106 See, e.g., In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (listing “copying, . . 
. unexpected results created by the claimed invention, unexpected properties of the 
claimed invention, . . . licenses showing industry respect for the invention, . . . and 
skepticism of skilled artisans before the invention”) (citations omitted). 
 107 Supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 108 See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 84, at 1651 (listing “standard secondary 
considerations of nonobviousness” and describing their varying roles as “micro policy 
levers” in different industries).  
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within a particular fact pattern.
109
  With this approach, whether a par-
ticular “square” fact will fit into the “round” category defined in the 
traditional secondary-consideration analysis no longer is in question.  
For example, the location of the observed evidence along a spectrum 
of potential circumstances can be identified, and when viewed in 
light of the activities of others in the actual field, the totality of this 
evidence will suggest some particular degree of inventiveness.  Does 
this comparison suggest an innovative leap?  If so, the invention is 
likely nonobvious.  How does the analysis change if the circumstances 
surrounding the evidence were different, such as if fewer artisans 
were active in the field or if an enabling component appeared more 
recently?  A holistic approach allows consideration of evidence in all 
situations where it is available and is adaptable to a wide variety of 
circumstances regardless of its ability to fit neatly within traditional 
secondary considerations categories. 
In this vein, Professor John Duffy has recently suggested analyz-
ing the length of time between the appearance of the technology 
enabling the invention and the invention itself rather than merely 
looking for evidence of a long-felt but unmet need.
110
  This time pe-
riod could then be evaluated in the context of the particular field’s 
rate of innovation—the time required for research developments in a 
field to be followed by utility developments—to lend further industry 
specificity to the inquiry.
111
  Similarly, the cost and uncertainty over-
come in the particular inventive process could be situated on a spec-
trum of cost and uncertainty and compared to the aggregate mea-
surements in a particular field rather than looking for evidence of the 
narrowly construed considerations of simultaneous invention by oth-
ers, failure of others, or copying.
112
  In theory, a patentability analysis 
 
 109 See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 110–12. 
 110 Generally, an obvious discovery may not be made until some prior art change 
yields a “new component necessary for the innovation (a supply-side change) or a 
new market demand (a demand-side change).”  John F. Duffy, Nonobviousness—The 
Shape of Things to Come: A Timing Approach to Patentability, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
343, 346 (2008).  If no such change can explain the discovery—i.e., if supply and 
demand considerations are unchanged for a substantial period of time—“then the 
innovation was almost certainly nonobvious.”  Id. 
 111 See, e.g., Jacob Schmookler, Changes in Industry and in the State of Knowledge as 
Determinants of Industrial Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 195, 195–96 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 
1962). 
 112 Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley advocate addressing technology speci-
ficity by contextualizing a particular innovation within the collective industry: 
A more efficient approach would be to inquire more generally into the 
cost and uncertainty of innovation in an industry as a whole, and to set 
rules that apply to a given industry.  Uncertainty is difficult to measure 
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should not be relegated to a particular group of predefined catego-
ries of “secondary considerations”; any appropriate evidence that 
speaks to the obviousness of the invention should be considered ac-
cording to where it appears along the relevant spectrum of possibili-
ties. 
Such objective evidence should also be divided in another way 
for analytical purposes: it should be separated into those indicia that 
are recognizable at the time of the invention (i.e., the “prior art”) 
and those that only appear after the invention (usually in the mar-
ketplace where the invention is offered).  Of the two categories, ob-
jective evidence that exists or occurs prior to the invention is proba-
bly a more reliable indicator of obviousness because it is less easily 
manipulated by the other (non-innovation) activities of the inventor, 
such as marketing efforts.  In addition, these preexisting factors will 
play a significantly more substantial role in the patent application 
and prosecution process, during which substantially less data may be 
available with which to analyze ex-post obviousness factors.  In gener-
al, objective evidence appearing at the time of invention will speak to 
the level of skill and inventiveness in the art and the “probability” of 
invention, whereas postinvention evidence serves to corroborate 
these conclusions with the opinion of the marketplace.
113
  Stated 
another way, the former is a fundamental evaluation of how the in-
vention measures up to the work of the theoretical PHOSITA, and 
the latter is a derivative indicator. 
a. Objective Evidence Prior to the Time of Invention 
At the time of invention, the objective evidence can be further 
divided into two categories: facts demonstrating the actual level of 
skill and inventiveness of the field of actual artisans (as compared to 
the theoretical PHOSITA) and facts indicating the probability of re-
presentativeness of this field (the likelihood that these actual artisans 
approximate the PHOSITA).  The actual level of skill in the aggre-
gated field can be understood by looking at the amount of time be-
 
with respect to a specific invention.  It is uncertainty across many in-
ventions—the number of inventions that do not pan out and conse-
quently do not result in patent applications—that the test is designed 
to measure.  That measurement can only be done in the aggregate, ra-
ther than in individual terms.  On this more general approach, uncer-
tainty of innovation as a nonobviousness factor would be a macro poli-
cy lever.   
Burk & Lemley, supra note 84, at 1662. 
 113 See, e.g., Dickey-John Corp. v. Int’l Tapetronics Corp., 710 F.2d 329, 346 (7th 
Cir. 1983). 
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tween supply- or demand-side changes and the resulting discoveries 
or failures by those in the field.
114
  This “appearance-timing” analysis 
essentially requires viewing the claimed invention in the context of 
changes in the prior art or in circumstances of invention that make 
the invention possible.  For instance, a new market demand that is 
quickly and easily met with a combination of preexisting elements 
suggests obviousness whereas the first appearance of the same inven-
tion ten years later seems much less likely to be obvious.  By compar-
ing the timing of the appearance of enabling components or tangible 
market demand to the timing of the invention, questions of degree 
can be considered. 
The classic secondary considerations of long-felt but unmet 
need, the failure of others, and simultaneous invention represent ex-
tremes on this appearance-timing spectrum: 
 
Appearance-Timing Spectrum 
 
 
 
 
 
On one side of the spectrum, a long-known but unmet market 
demand for a product requiring the invention, which was not satis-
fied until the discovery of the invention, suggests nonobviousness
115
: 
 
A. One Extreme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 114 See discussion supra note 110.  Of course, identifying and isolating the relevant 
changes poses a distinct challenge within the factual inquiry.  
 115 E.g., In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F. 
Supp. 1354, 1378 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“The existence of an enduring, unmet need is 
strong evidence that the invention is novel, not obvious, and not anticipated.  If 
people are clamoring for a solution, and the best minds do not find it for years, that 
is practical evidence—the kind that can’t be bought from a hired expert, the kind 
that does not depend on fallible memories or doubtful inferences—of the state of 
knowledge.”), aff’d, 71 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
t = 0 Time after demand appears until discovery
Increasing likelihood of nonobviousness
Demand or enabling component appears 
t = 0 tlong 
A long period of unmet demand suggests nonobviousness
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If the invention were obvious, the desire for profit would have 
been sufficient to satisfy the need quickly
116
: 
 
B. The Other Extreme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Likewise, the failure of others also suggests that a demand for 
the invention exists and has been identified but that designing and 
implementing a solution is not obvious.
117
  This implies a level of dif-
ficulty and complexity that cannot be overcome by an obvious com-
bination of prior-known elements.  Thus, a large number of failures 
in a short period following a supply or demand change suggest that a 
solution is not obvious
118
: 
 
C. Variation 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the other side of the spectrum is near-simultaneous inven-
tion by two or more parties.  Multiple coincident successes suggest 
 
 116 E.g., In re Fielder, 471 F.2d 640, 644 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (“A defect in a product or 
process spurs the businessman to deploy resources for discovering a solution. . . . Ex-
istence of the defect creates a demand for its correction, and it is reasonable to infer 
that the defect would not persist were the solution ‘obvious.’” (quoting Richard L. 
Robbins, Note, Subtests of “Nonobviousness,” 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1169, 1172 (1964))). 
 117 E.g., Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (“[S]uch evidence of failed attempts by others could be determinative on the 
issue of obviousness.”). 
 118 Failure of others is also related to the probability calculus in that, in addition 
to suggesting the density of marketplace and invention competition facing the inven-
tor, for every failure registered by another party, the probability of the inventor’s 
success increases from any knowledge of failure that enriches the prior art.  See infra 
note 124. 
F5F4F3F2 F1 tdiscover
Nearly simultaneous demand appearance and supply discovery 
suggests obviousness 
tshort t = 0 
t = 0 
Multiple prior failures by others suggests nonobviousness 
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t3tdiscovert2
that the invention is obvious, especially where these discoveries occur 
shortly after the supply or demand change
119
: 
 
D. Variation 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under the appearance-timing analysis, each of these three par-
ticular objective considerations (long-felt but unmet need, the failure 
of others, and simultaneous invention) is viewed preferably not as 
simply present or absent.  Rather, all of the evidence is viewed in its 
totality, giving the discovery’s location on the appearance-timing con-
tinuum whatever probative value it has.  Thus, the inventor’s actual 
level of inventiveness becomes evident by comparison to the efforts 
and inventive abilities of other actual artisans in the field during the 
period following a change in supply or demand
120
 regardless of the 
presence or absence of a particular consideration as traditionally un-
derstood. 
In addition to evaluating the level of inventiveness of the 
PHOSITA’s field by looking at the degree of inventiveness of an ac-
tual group of skilled artisans in the marketplace, understanding how 
well these actual artisans replicate the inventiveness of the theoretical 
PHOSITA is necessary.  Accordingly, the probability that the actual 
accurately represents the theoretical must be taken into account.  
One factor in evaluating this “probability of representativeness” is the 
density of competition.  If the aggregated field of potential inventors 
working to address the same problem or make the same improve-
ment serves as a rough approximation of the theoretical PHOSITA, 
the field more likely represents the level of ordinary skill and inven-
 
 119 See, e.g., Monarch Knitting Mach. Corp. v. Sulzer Morat GmbH, 139 F.3d 877, 
883–84 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (examining the interplay between “evidence of contempo-
raneous development” and “‘long-felt but unsolved need,’ not long-felt need in isola-
tion”). 
 120 Although the issue of supply- and demand-side changes has been more typical-
ly related to the strength of a commercial success argument, see, e.g., Am. Infra-Red 
Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus., Inc., 360 F.2d 977, 989–91 (8th Cir. 1966), the impli-
cations of such changes logically extend to secondary considerations of nonobvious-
ness more generally. 
t1 t = 0 
Nearly simultaneous invention suggests  
obviousness
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tiveness when competition is denser.
121
  Thus, in a “thick” market-
place, an inventor who succeeds where others have failed has more 
likely made a true inventive step.
122
  Additionally, more resources be-
ing expended on an area where competition is denser means that 
even a nonobvious invention will likely be discovered more quickly
123
 
because the rate of the search will be faster.
124
  Finally, the cost and 
uncertainty of innovation in the industry itself also factor into the 
probability determination.  Understanding the degree of uncertainty 
is useful in that the greater the uncertainty in the field, the less likely 
actual prior-art activities and information are predictive of future re-
sults.
125
  In such cases, the experience of the field of actual potential 
inventors may not accurately represent the knowledge and expe-
rience of the PHOSITA.  Thus, the crowdedness of the field, the pace 
of research, and the field’s degree of certainty all figure into the re-
presentativeness determination.  When the appearance-timing in-
formation is viewed in light of the degree of artisan-PHOSITA resem-
blance, such preinvention evidence speaks strongly to inventiveness. 
 
 121 A statistical analogy is provided by the Central Limit Theorem, which says that 
for any population having a finite mean and standard deviation, the sampling distri-
bution of the sample mean increasingly resembles a normal distribution as the sam-
ple size increases.  According to this theory, the larger the sample size, the more like-
ly the mean of the sample approximates the mean of the population.  DAVID K. 
HILDEBRAND, R. LYMAN OTT & J. BRIAN GRAY, BASIC STATISTICAL IDEAS FOR MANAGERS 
228–30 (2d ed. 2005). 
 122 Another statistical analogy is provided by the concept of the confidence inter-
val.  Confidence that a particular sample is or is not an outlier of the sample popula-
tion is inversely proportional to the square root of the sample size.  As the sample 
size increases, the confidence level increases, and whether a particular data point is 
an outlier is more certain.  Id. at 269–72. 
 123 Considering the “time” axis of the appearance-timing spectrum not in terms of 
particular units of time measurement (days, weeks, years, etc.) but rather in terms of 
inventive attempts by those addressing the supply or demand change is helpful.  
Theoretically, for the purposes of evaluating appearance timing, many inventors ac-
tive across a short unit of time may be equivalent to a few inventors over a longer pe-
riod. 
 124 Basic probability teaches that the probability of an event equals the ratio of the 
number of available favorable outcomes to the total number of possible outcomes.  
As negative possible outcomes are eliminated, the probability of favorable outcomes 
increases.  HILDEBRAND, OTT & GRAY, supra note 121, at 84–85. 
 125 A final statistical analogy is the concept of standard deviation, which measures 
the amount of variability in a sample.  If the standard deviation of a sample is high, 
the particular value of the next single measurement is less certain, but the properties 
of the distribution itself may be known.  Id. at 35–37.  In investment terms, “it is rea-
sonable to assume that portfolios with histories of high variability also have the least 
predictable future performance” although, “[o]f course, there is no risk in hind-
sight.”  RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 184 (9th ed. 2008). 
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b. Objective Evidence After the Time of Invention 
After the time of invention, additional factors emerge that may 
corroborate the obviousness or nonobviousness of the invention.  
These factors speak to how the marketplace perceives the invention 
and can indicate an extension beyond the ordinary level of skill and 
inventiveness in the art.  Generally, these provide later-in-time objec-
tive evidence to bolster the obviousness evidence that was available at 
the time of the invention.  For example, to the extent that commer-
cial success is due to the merit of the invention, it may be a sign of 
nonobviousness.
126
  Great commercial success implicitly suggests that 
the market harbored a long-felt need that others failed to satisfy
127
 
and thus can be used postinvention to corroborate evidence of long-
felt need and failure of others at the time of invention.
128
 
Likewise, use of the invention by competitors—whether by li-
censing, copying, or infringing—is a corollary and corroborative of 
the failure of others in the field.
129
  Both legal and illegal forms of co-
pying suggest that while a competitor was interested in satisfying a 
market demand in other ways, it was unable or unwilling to do so.
130
  
 
 126 Both the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have accepted commercial suc-
cess as evidence of nonobviousness in many cases.  See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 279 (1944) (upholding lower-court determina-
tion based on finding of commercial success); Akzo N.V. v. U.S. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n., 808 F.2d 1471, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1986).  But a nexus must exist between the 
patent’s claim and the commercial success.  See, e.g., Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Gen-
mark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 127 E.g., Dickey-John Corp. v. Int’l Tapetronics Corp., 710 F.2d 329, 346 (7th Cir. 
1983) (“If the patent in issue filled a need that was not only genuine, but long felt—
that is, long consciously recognized—the inference is that for a long period of time 
actual artisans were attempting to solve the problem.  The greater the need, and the 
longer it was felt, the stronger the inference.”). 
 128 In fact, Judge Hand felt that commercial success was only relevant as an indica-
tor of nonobviousness when preceded by a long-felt but unmet need.  See Ruben 
Condenser Co. v. Aerovox Corp., 77 F.2d 266, 268 (2d Cir. 1935). 
 129 See, e.g., Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1285 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (finding defendant’s “wholesale copying of the claimed invention”—after 
“entirely unsuccessful” independent efforts—to be “compelling evidence of nonob-
viousness”); Dow Chem. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 816 F.2d 617, 622 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(noting that the defendant “tried but failed to develop the claimed invention and 
copied it instead”); Vandenberg v. Dairy Equip. Co., 740 F.2d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (finding that evidence of copying is particularly useful “where the copyist had 
itself attempted for a substantial length of time to design a similar device, and had 
failed”). 
 130 See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) (“That [defendant], a large corporation with many engineers on its staff, did 
not copy any prior art device, but found it necessary to copy the [invention] of the 
claims in suit, is equally strong evidence of nonobviousness.”), vacated, 475 U.S. 809 
(1986) (questioning the standard of review applied by the Federal Circuit). 
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This may mean that the innovator discovered a solution that was not 
obvious to others of ordinary skill and thus suggests the nonobvious-
ness of the invention. 
Finally, artisans’ statements of professional approval or disap-
proval are the equivalent of a retrospective analysis of the prior-art 
situation by those skillful in the art.
131
  While it may not be a perfect 
hindsight evaluation because artisans are not necessarily equivalent to 
theoretical PHOSITAs, this evidence has the advantage both of being 
from a backward-looking point of view (similar to a court’s determi-
nation) and of deriving from intimate background knowledge in the 
field of the invention (greater than that of a typical court).
132
  Given 
these corroborative functions, postinvention evidence of commercial 
success, copying, and artisans’ statements should be given weight as 
additional objective evidence. 
3. Emphasizing Objective Evidence as the Best Way to 
Understand Graham’s PHOSITA 
After KSR, any obviousness determination should be increasingly 
fact- and evidence-based.  Rather than considering objective evidence 
as “secondary,” such evidence should form a critical part of the Gra-
ham analysis.  This evidence helps to understand the inventive posi-
tion of the PHOSITA beyond the assistance provided by the bare 
construct of the Graham comparison; it is used to see what the gap be-
tween the prior art and the claimed invention means—whether it 
represents a true inventive step.  The objective evidence available at 
the time of invention informs the inquiry into the level of skill and 
inventiveness of the artisans in the field (e.g., appearance timing, in-
cluding long-felt need and the success or failure of others) and tells 
how closely this approximates the PHOSITA and future results by in-
forming the probability of representativeness (e.g., density of compe-
 
 131 See, e.g., Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. BOC Group, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 897, 914–16 
(D.N.J. 1987) (citing an alleged infringer’s statements of praise made prior to litiga-
tion as “a strong indication of the non-obviousness” of the invention); cf. Minn. Min-
ing & Mfg. v. Smith & Nephew, PLC, No. 3-91 CIV 274, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22785 
(D. Minn. July 27, 1992) (ordering discovery of marketing and sales data relating to 
defendant’s allegedly infringing products as probative of both the patent’s nonob-
viousness and defendant’s subjective beliefs about the “relative uniqueness, superior-
ity and marketability of a disputed patent”). 
 132 For a discussion of this issue, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Eva-
luating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 888 
(2004).  In particular, artisans’ statements can somewhat mitigate the fundamental 
dangers of hindsight bias in patent law that were evidenced in the KSR decision—
after-the-fact determinations based on common sense made by those with little rele-
vant technical knowledge.  See supra notes 16–17, 61–62, 67 and accompanying text. 
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tition, pace, and uncertainty of innovation).  Additional objective 
evidence available at the time of litigation and potentially prosecu-
tion (e.g., commercial success, copying by others, and artisans’ state-
ments) corroborates the pre-existing objective evidence but probably 
commands less importance because of the significant influence of 
other activities by the inventor. 
As noted in KSR,
133
 a frequent complaint
134
 about the use of “sec-
ondary considerations” is the lack of available evidence,135 but finding 
the evidence is easier if the inquiry is considered in broader terms 
than usual.  For instance, long-felt need and the failure of others re-
quire specific evidence satisfying predefined notions.  If these are re-
construed as considerations of “appearance timing,” any evidence 
can be used to understand where the PHOSITA lies relative to the 
continuum of possible skill and inventiveness.  In a complementary 
fashion, the probability of representativeness reveals how well this ob-
jective evidence, to whatever extent it is available, represents the 
PHOSITA and the PHOSITA’s theoretical inventive activity. 
B. Objective Evidence Directly Demonstrates the Innovation Needs of 
Different Industries 
The true test of an obviousness analytical framework that is 
grounded in objective evidence is its suitability to the ever-changing 
needs of patent-dependent industries.  Not only is objective evidence 
more attuned to the needs of the fact finder without skill in the art, 
but also, because it flows directly from the inventive circumstances 
within the art, it provides the best evidence of industry needs and 
how the patent system can appropriately respond to those needs. 
 
 133 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 425–26 (2007); supra text accom-
panying note 59. 
 134 In conjunction with his empirical study of hindsight bias, Professor Gregory 
Mandel’s review of Federal Circuit and district court obviousness decisions reveals 
that traditional “[s]econdary consideration evidence appears to affect only a small 
percentage of non-obvious decisions.”  Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Em-
pirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1391, 1425 (2006). Professor Mandel argues that this is insufficient to miti-
gate the hindsight bias that he observed in his study.  Id. 
 135 Furthermore, a lack of evidence of traditional secondary considerations 
(commercial success, long-felt but unmet need, copying, etc.) was previously consi-
dered to have no bearing whatsoever on the obviousness determination.  See, e.g., 
Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 960 (Fed. Cir. 
1986); Medtronic, Inc. v. Intermedics, Inc., 799 F.2d 734, 739 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1986); 
Steven P. Smith & Kurt R. Van Thomme, Bridge Over Troubled Water: The Supreme 
Court’s New Patent Obviousness Standard in KSR Should Be Readily Apparent and Benefit 
the Public, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 127, 189 (2007).  Thus, the conceptualization of 
objective evidence as a continuum departs from this convention. 
GEERS (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2010  1:15 PM 
2010] COMMENT 257 
1. Industrial Contexts 
To understand the implications of a one-size-fits-all patent sys-
tem across the range of applicable technologies, conditions in three 
disparate industries are analyzed: the mechanical, pharmaceutical, 
and computer industries.  As the tentative foundation for new ob-
viousness jurisprudence, the KSR decision can be considered the me-
chanical-arts benchmark from which decisions based on other tech-
nologies will depart.  The patent system was originally created 
primarily to protect mechanical technologies,
136
 and so the develop-
ment of the field extends back to at least the inception of the patent 
system.
137
  Therefore, the mechanical arts are unsurprisingly generally 
well developed and well understood in comparison to most other pa-
tent-utilizing technology fields,
138
 and developments in the mechani-
cal arts are now patented with less and less frequency.
139
  Thus, in 
many cases, “common sense” may be enough for most people to un-
derstand developments in this field because inventions (such as the 
brake pedal in KSR) have components that are readily identifiable 
and whose functions frequently can be understood intuitively by non-
artisans.
140
  The well-developed character of the field and the layper-
son’s ease of grasping general concepts make the mechanical arts an 
appropriate baseline in the obviousness determination.  They serve a 
similar function as a representative of the middle ground between 
the disparate needs of the computer and pharmaceutical industries; 
while the mechanical arts cover a broad range of development uncer-
 
 136 Historical circumstances suggest that patent law doctrines were created with 
primarily mechanical inventions in mind:  
The “useful arts” envisioned by the Framers were mechanical inven-
tions useful in a primarily agrarian economy. . . .  As late as 1950, 
though, most inventions were still mechanical in nature.  It is only in 
the last half-century . . . that patent law has lost its primarily mechani-
cal character, branching out into biotechnology, semiconductors, 
computer hardware and software, electronics, and telecommunica-
tions. 
Burk & Lemley, supra note 79, at 1159; see also Allison & Lemley, supra note 77, at 79. 
 137 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 79, at 1159 (contrasting this history with the rel-
atively recent advent of other technology areas). 
 138 E.g., In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (characterizing “mechani-
cal or electrical elements” as “involving predictable factors” with “performance cha-
racteristics predicted by resort to known scientific laws” and characterizing “most 
chemical reactions and physiological activity” as “involving unpredictable factors”). 
 139 Allison & Lemley, supra note 77, at 93. 
 140 For example, the KSR decision “originated from litigation revolving around a 
relatively simple automobile mechanical patent involving technology with which 
most are familiar.”  Smith & Van Thomme, supra note 135, at 134. 
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tainty, cost, and speed, as well as varying degrees of patent coverage,
141
 
the computer and pharmaceutical industries occupy the extremes of 
these spans. 
In contrast to the mechanical arts, the computer industry is cha-
racterized by a relatively short product development cycle, low capital 
intensity, and a short product life cycle.
142
  Generally, products are ra-
pidly superseded by new generations in the marketplace (frequently 
within a year or two)
143
 and may be readily copied and sold.
144
  Pro-
grams and equipment can be developed from scratch or, more fre-
quently, based on improvements or modifications of previous appli-
cations.
145
  In addition, the software marketplace is not extensively 
government regulated but instead relies on voluntary standards de-
veloped by industry members.
146
  With respect to the industry’s pa-
 
 141 This is due in part to the broad range of industrial applicability of mechanical 
inventions in contrast to the narrower industrial settings of pharmaceutical and 
computer arts.  Many mechanical inventions encompass automotive, medical device, 
or electronic technologies, for example, with corresponding and distinct innovation 
and patenting patterns.  See Allison & Lemley, supra note 77, at 89, 91–94. 
 142 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 69, ch. 3, at 2 (“[C]omputer hardware and 
software industry representatives . . . described an innovation process that is generally 
significantly less costly than in the pharmaceutical and biotech industries, and they 
spoke of a product life cycle that is generally much shorter.”). 
 143 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.  For example, Apple has released a 
new generation of its “Classic” iPod every year since its introduction of the first mod-
el.  Apple.com, Identifying iPod Models, http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1353 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2010).  This is consistent with an incremental or cumulative na-
ture of product development.  See infra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 144 This is obviously not unique to this industrial context given the general func-
tion of patents to prevent copying by competitors, and industry members express 
conflicting opinions on the value of patents in preventing such “free riding.”  See FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, supra note 69, ch. 3, at 48–49.  It is nonetheless pervasive and prob-
lematic for many reasons.  See, e.g., Brian Grow et al., Dangerous Fakes: How Counterfeit, 
Defective Computer Components from China Are Getting into U.S. Warplanes and Ships, 
BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 2, 2008, at 34, available at http://www.businessweek.com/ 
magazine/content/08_41/b4103034193886.htm (underscoring the dangerous and 
pervasive problem of counterfeit computer components purchased by the U.S. mili-
tary). 
 145 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 69, ch. 3, at 44–45; Richard C. Levin, President, 
Yale Univ., Speech at the FTC/DOJ Joint Hearings on Competition and Intellectual 
Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy (Feb. 6, 2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020206ftc.pdf (“[I]n contrast to this discrete na-
ture of chemical and pharmaceutical products, in other key technologies, such as 
microelectronics, telecommunications and computers, [progress] was cumulative.”); 
see also Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software 
Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 41 (2001) (discussing the impact of cumulative innovation 
on the scope of patent protection). 
 146 See, e.g., BRIAN KAHIN, COMPUTER & COMMC’NS INDUS. ASSOC., PATENT REFORM 
FOR A DIGITAL ECONOMY 24 (2006), available at http://www.ccianet.org/CCIA/ 
files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000000081/CCIA_WP_PatReformDigEcon.pdf 
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tenting needs, the complexity of electronics products poses special 
patenting problems.  Because a wide array of features, components, 
functions, etc., are encompassed within each product—each of which 
may be patentable individually
147—generally no one-to-one corres-
pondence exists between a patent and a product in the computer in-
dustry.
148
  For these reasons, the computer industry is particularly vul-
nerable to patent thickets, innocent infringement, and patent 
trolling,
149
 and the computer industry has thus led the call for patent 
reform.
150
 
Strongly opposing any patent reform, and in stark contrast to 
the computer industry, is the pharmaceutical industry, where a hand-
ful of patents generally protect a long-lived product.
151
  A pharma-
ceutical company generally relies on a short list of patented, mar-
keted products to support its entire operation,
152
 which is 
characterized by a long product development cycle, high capital in-
tensity, and a generally long but variable product life cycle.
153
  With 
 
(“Cognizant of the need to spur innovation and create new markets, IT firms invest 
heavily in developing standards.  Freely usable nonproprietary standards . . . were re-
sponsible for the rapid uptake and spectacular success of the Internet, the Web, and 
the many services and products built on top of these platforms.”).  
 147 E.g., Kahin, supra note 78, at 390 (observing that in “the extreme complex-
product environment associated with information technology[,] . . . an inexpensive 
product may contain thousands, perhaps tens or hundreds of thousands of potential-
ly patentable functions and components”).   
 148 Id. 
 149 Id.; FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 69, ch. 3, at 34–41 (discussing the problems 
of “patent thickets” and “non-practicing entities” such as “‘professional’ patent asser-
tion companies”). 
 150 E.g., KAHIN, supra note 146, at 5 (“Today, talk of reform is widespread and 
loudly voiced, especially in the high-tech community.  Is the patent system broken?  
Many in information technology say that it is . . . .”). 
 151 Id. at 6 (“Yet efforts to reform the system through legislative action are easily 
paralyzed by highly motivated contending interests.  Pharmaceutical companies with 
a handful of patents protecting billions of dollars in drug investment do not want to 
see the value or power of these patents diminished in any way.”).   
 152 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 69, ch. 3, at 5 (“The brand-name companies’ 
trade association reports that most newly marketed drugs do not cover their average 
development costs.  Brand-name companies typically rely on a small number of 
‘blockbuster’ drugs to recoup their overall investment in innovation, including R&D 
costs for failed products.”); see also PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., supra note 85, at 
3. 
 153 Pharmaceutical and biotech corporate representatives described the indus-
tries’ innovation as “costly and unpredictable, requiring significant amounts of pio-
neering research to discover and test new drug products.”  FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra 
note 69, ch. 3, at 1.  These firms desire patents to prevent free-riding by rivals so as to 
ensure that the firms “recoup the substantial capital investments made to discover, 
test, and obtain regulatory approval of new drug products,” and they emphasized the 
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respect to the industry’s patenting needs, the length of a product de-
velopment cycle is typically long but extremely unpredictable because 
of considerable uncertainty in innovation.
154
  With respect to patent-
holder revenue, the effective patent life is comparatively short
155
 be-
cause the research, development, and regulatory-approval processes 
are so lengthy.
156
  Finally, the pharmaceutical marketplace requires 
regulatory approval for entry,
157
 a burden not as common outside this 
industry.  Thus, to support the cost and uncertainty of product devel-
opment, pharmaceutical innovation requires generally strong patent 
protection.
158
 
2. Developing Industry-Specific Factual Presumptions 
When undertaking a factual, evidence-based inquiry in conjunc-
tion with a post-KSR obviousness determination, the characteristics of 
each industry at the time of invention will necessarily play an impor-
tant role.  To the extent that such characteristics are generalizable 
across each industry, the objective evidence examined and weighed 
in the obviousness determination may be generalizable as well.  Of 
course, some evidence may require a true case-by-case analysis even 
within an industry, such as where generalities do not apply to the cir-
cumstances of a particular case.  Yet a properly applied factual pre-
sumption on elements of the obviousness determination lends a de-
sirable consistency to the analysis and ensures that the needs of the 
industry are properly addressed. 
In contrast to how some have characterized previous obviousness 
determinations,
159
 these presumptions are factual, not legal.  Previous 
 
importance of patent protection in attracting necessary high-risk capital investments.  
Id. 
 154 Id. ch. 3, at 16 (“‘[T]he pharmaceutical industry is several times more R&D 
intensive than any other industry.’  R&D is particularly lengthy for biotechnology 
firms, because biotechnology innovation is more uncertain than innovation in other 
industries.”). 
 155 According to the pharmaceutical industry group The Pharmaceutical Research 
and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), the effective patent life of drug patents is 
shortening and will likely continue to do so.  PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., supra 
note 85, at 16 (“While total patent life in the U.S. is 20 years, for medicines, much of 
that span is spent in research and development.  For example, drugs with more than 
$100 million in annual sales had an effective patent life of 11 years in 2003 through 
2005.  There is evidence that effective patent life is shortening and will continue to 
decline.”). 
 156 Id. at 3 (“[T]he R&D process takes an average of 10 to 15 years.”). 
 157 See id. at 4–5. 
 158 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 159 See generally Burk & Lemley, supra note 79.  Professors Burk and Lemley argue 
that Federal Circuit decisions have developed separate standards for particular in-
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decisions have been criticized for too closely following judicial, rather 
than technology and innovation, trends: 
We just keep replicating the old results based on the old prece-
dents, whether they have kept pace with changes in business, 
changes in technology, or changes of a different sort . . . .  [W]e 
just get the Federal Circuit talking to itself, with the brief writer 
just being the echo of what we wrote in all those prior cases.  And 
then we write some more cases, and the cycle just goes on and on 
and on.  And it certainly lacks the benefit of being tightly wired to 
the evolving reality.
160
 
Courts risk turning factual presumptions into de facto legal pre-
sumptions when they refer to previous decisions rather than to the 
true factual underpinnings of the inventive process, and the criticism 
of the technology-specificity of obviousness determinations suggests 
that this often leads to incorrect results.  Yet a properly understood 
factual presumption may be rebutted easily by an accurate factual in-
quiry
161
 and acts as a safeguard against overreliance. 
Although the concept of generalizing to factual presumptions 
may be useful, this is only true when attempting to understand the 
theoretical mindset of the PHOSITA at the time of the invention.  
Postinvention presumptions are not proper because postinvention 
objective evidence merely corroborates obviousness inferences based 
on circumstances at the time of invention and does not teach any-
thing new about the PHOSITA.  These later considerations may be 
deemed truly “secondary.”  The particular circumstances of each in-
dustry speak to the utility and appropriate weight of this postinven-
tion corroborative evidence for the fact finder, but they do not sug-
gest a place for ex post facto evidence within a presumed starting 
point of obviousness or nonobviousness. 
Thus, for each industry, understanding exactly where preinven-
tion presumptions are appropriate and how best to apply them is use-
ful.  Industrial characteristics must be considered with respect to the 
appearance-timing analysis, the probability of representativeness, and 
the secondary corroborative evidence, but only the former two in-
form the primary factual presumption. 
 
dustries by “substitut[ing] caricature for a nuanced understanding of the technolo-
gy” and warn that these standards are then applied deferentially in subsequent deci-
sions.  Id. at 1191. 
 160 Kahin, supra note 78, at 396 (quoting Judge Michel of the Federal Circuit). 
 161 Experience has shown that a misunderstood “legal” presumption is not as easi-
ly ignored.  Burk & Lemley, supra note 79, at 1185. 
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3. Applying Industrial Characteristics to Achieve the 
Proper Factual Presumptions 
First, an analysis of the characteristics of the mechanical arts 
suggests a preinvention factual presumption of obviousness.  Al-
though appearance timing necessarily depends on when the inven-
tion appears in relation to the appearance of a supply or demand 
change, the advanced development of the mechanical arts means that 
these inventions generally appear quickly,
162
 though significant varia-
bility exists.
163
  The present comparatively extensive understanding of 
the underlying principles, clear from the prior art, means that devel-
opments are frequently rapid,
164
 which creates a significantly larger 
hurdle to demonstrating nonobviousness than was present historical-
ly.  Because of this significant suggestion of obviousness, evidence of 
long-felt but unmet need or the failure of others is particularly rele-
vant and persuasive.  These considerations strongly suggest nonob-
viousness when viewed against the backdrop of the high level of ordi-
nary skill in the art.  Likewise, the adeptness of the actual mechanical 
engineer probably is considerably representative of the theoretical 
PHOSITA in the mechanical arts.  Although the density of competi-
tion is likely to be case-specific and particular to the object of the in-
vention, the cost and uncertainty of innovation in the mechanical arts 
is sufficiently low that even the successes or failures of a few artisans 
can demonstrate whether the problem can be solved using only the 
level of ordinary skill.  Thus, these industrial characteristics suggest a 
strong factual presumption of obviousness, although evidence of 
nonobviousness likewise has significant weight given the broader 
spectrum of particular industrial settings that the mechanical arts en-
compass.
165
 
If a mechanical invention faces a high burden to show nonob-
viousness, postinvention objective evidence of commercial success, 
copying, or artisan praise is particularly important to rebut this fac-
tual presumption.  Similar to the preinvention analysis, the presence 
of these factors may have considerable weight where a high level of 
ordinary skill is apparent.  Commercial success and copying because 
of the technical merit of the invention can demonstrate nonobvious-
ness because a range of alternative solutions is likely in a well-
developed field.  Likewise, given the lower complexity and uncertain-
 
 162 See supra notes 138–40 and accompanying text. 
 163 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 164 See supra notes 138–40 and accompanying text. 
 165 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
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ty of the field, laudatory statements by peers are likely to be rare un-
less a solution is nonobvious.
166
  Such evidence is especially critical 
where the degree of variability in the sophistication of the mechani-
cal arts results in a poor fit between the factual presumption and the 
actual inventive circumstances. 
Recent decisions support this rebuttable factual presumption of 
obviousness.  The KSR decision has shown that remarkably little is re-
quired to demonstrate obviousness in the mechanical arts; namely, 
prior-art references containing the elements and common sense will 
suffice.  Although not expressly addressed in the decision, the court 
implied that objective evidence probably has to be quite strong to be 
considered a significant factor and overcome the presumption of ob-
viousness.  In the later Federal Circuit decision, In re ICON Health & 
Fitness, Inc.,
167
 which concerned a treadmill containing a folding base 
that stayed upright by use of a spring mechanism, the court reaf-
firmed the high level of ordinary skill and the general presumption 
of the obviousness of combinations that was apparent in KSR.
168
 
Similarly, an analysis of the characteristics of the computer arts 
suggests a preinvention factual presumption of obviousness.  Al-
though computers and related technology are newer than mechani-
cal endeavors, the art is nevertheless sophisticated and rapidly ad-
vancing.
169
  Swift product-development timelines in response to 
changing market demands suggest that the appearance-timing analy-
sis favors a factual presumption of obviousness.  The high level of skill 
of the ordinary computer engineer, also evidenced by the ability to 
address technological challenges confidently, cheaply, and rapidly,
170
 
closely resembles that of the theoretical PHOSITA.  Specific objective 
evidence suggesting nonobviousness thus has considerable impact 
when it contradicts these assumptions about the predictability and 
high level of skill in the art.  In all these ways, the computer-arts anal-
ysis closely resembles the mechanical-arts baseline and its factual pre-
sumption of obviousness. 
 
 166 But examining the extent to which this evidence relates to the technical merit 
of the patented invention, as distinguished from the effects of other marketplace 
forces or of incorporation of the invention as a component of a larger product that is 
successful, copied, or praised, is always necessary.  This is frequently referred to as 
the “nexus requirement.”  See, e.g., Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 
1015, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 167 496 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 168 Id. at 1380–82 (providing an analysis of the obviousness of a combination of 
prior art references that echoes the analysis in KSR). 
 169 See supra notes 142–45 and accompanying text. 
 170 See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
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In other ways, the analysis necessarily departs from the mechani-
cal arts.  Most importantly, the analysis by the fact finder is consider-
ably complicated by the fact that the technical concepts are less ac-
cessible to the layperson.  Reliance on common sense or intuitive 
understanding is insufficient, and a factual presumption of obvious-
ness may lead alternatively to a desirable simplification of the evi-
dence examined by the fact finder or to an undesirable overreliance 
on the presumption.  In either case, although a factual presumption 
of obviousness may be appropriate and common sense may still be re-
levant, evaluating objective evidence in the computer arts may neces-
sarily require a more careful assessment than the cursory KSR opi-
nion may suggest. 
Other distinctions between the mechanical arts and the comput-
er arts significantly complicate the analysis of postinvention evidence.  
The historical types of objective evidence discussed earlier
171
 were 
identified to address the mechanical arts, and the evolving applica-
tions of the patent system means that their use in more modern in-
dustrial contexts is not always without criticism.
172
  The most signifi-
cant issue for the computer arts is the general lack of correspondence 
between the invention and the product.
173
  The industry’s marketed 
products are highly complex and involve a multitude of patentable 
components.
174
  Therefore, tying the commercial success of a product 
to the nonobviousness of a component is generally difficult except in 
rare cases.  Where the market success of a product can be attributed 
to a discrete, unique feature or function related to the patented im-
provement, however, the suggestion of nonobviousness is particularly 
strong.  Another aspect of this ill adaptation is the ability to patent 
software functions, somewhat akin to patenting concepts, in a way that 
was not possible in the mechanical arts, in which patents were gener-
ally limited to a tangible apparatus or process.
175
  Finally, computer 
 
 171 See supra notes 105–08 and accompanying text. 
 172 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic 
Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 805, 837–43 (1988) (“Nonetheless, commer-
cial success may be an inappropriate factor in patent decisions, because it relies upon 
indirect evidence, and because it assumes a simplistic conceptual model of innova-
tion.”).   
 173 E.g., Kahin, supra note 78, at 390. 
 174 Id. 
 175 For a discussion of this historical evolution, see Cohen & Lemley, supra note 
145, at 7–14; see also Kahin, supra note 78, at 389 (“The United States patent system 
has embraced new areas by expanding in several distinct directions: basic science 
(biotechnology), mathematics and logic (software), and the social sciences and lib-
eral arts professions (business methods).  This new subject matter is far removed 
from the 19th Century industrial technologies that the system was designed for.”). 
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and software development occurs in consortiums of patent holders 
who pool and cross-license patents in an effort to enable the devel-
opment of industry standards and avoid the paralysis of patent thick-
ets, which is an environment not historically contemplated.
176
  Thus, 
while copying by others and artisans’ laudatory statements still form 
part of any factual inquiry into obviousness, they cannot be viewed 
merely as present or absent; the fact finder must weigh the totality of 
the evidence and give due regard to the nature of the patented in-
vention and the patentee’s relationship to others in the industry.  
Postinvention objective evidence likely will frequently be of little use 
in rebutting a factual presumption of obviousness because of these 
complexity issues, and its use may even be ill advised where the fact 
finder is not sufficiently apprised of these divergences. 
Another recent Federal Circuit decision, Leapfrog Enterprises v. 
Fisher-Price, Inc.,
177
 reinforces the similarities between the obviousness 
analyses in the computer and mechanical arts that are fundamental 
to their shared resultant presumption.
178
  Leapfrog involved an “inter-
active learning device” that the court characterized as the combina-
tion of a similar analogue prior-art device and modern electronics.
179
  
The court then found this combination obvious, as in KSR, in light of 
the common sense of those skilled in the art
180
 and thus made it clear 
that the notion of “common sense” indirectly supporting a factual 
presumption of obviousness also applies in the electronics setting.  
Leapfrog also lends support to the idea that postinvention secondary 
considerations will rarely overcome the presumption of obviousness 
created by the preinvention factual environment: 
The district court explicitly stated in its opinion that Leapfrog 
had provided substantial evidence of commercial success, praise, 
and long-felt need, but that, given the strength of the prima facie 
obviousness showing, the evidence on secondary considerations 
was inadequate to overcome a final conclusion that [the inven-
tion] would have been obvious.
181
 
While this statement is not surprising—in fact, it is probably ex-
pected—greater analysis as to why the “substantial evidence” failed to 
overcome the presumption of obviousness would have been instruc-
tive. 
 
 176 See supra notes 146–49 and accompanying text. 
 177 485 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 178 See id. 
 179 Id. at 1158. 
 180 Id. at 1161. 
 181 Id. at 1162. 
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Finally, an analysis of the characteristics of the pharmaceutical 
arts suggests a preinvention factual presumption of nonobviousness 
that derives from significantly different factual analyses and generali-
zations from the previous two cases.  With respect to appearance tim-
ing, the length of time between the appearance of the invention and 
the appearance of a supply or demand change is still relevant, but in 
this case distinguishing between the time of the invention and the 
time of the invention’s appearance in the marketplace, which may be 
ten to fifteen years later, is especially critical.
182
  So while it is useful to 
compare the relative time to invention to that of similarly situated 
pharmaceutical developments for signs of nonobviousness, the use of 
evidence of a long-felt but unmet need must be prudent.  For exam-
ple, with notable exceptions,
183
 many diseases and conditions tackled 
by pharmaceutical inventions have been known for as long as humans 
have been around to suffer them, but the critical date for the timing 
analysis is actually the formulation of the basic biological understand-
ings that make the development of treatments possible.  In addition, 
significant regulatory lag time
184
 means that the unmet need will con-
tinue to be unmet for a significant period after a treatment’s discov-
ery.  Finally, success is the exception rather than the rule,
185
 and the 
failure of others (likely including considerable prior efforts by the pa-
tentee) can generally be assumed unless negated by evidence of the 
simultaneous invention by another.  Thus, given the generally slug-
gish pace of invention, the appearance-timing analysis suggests a low 
level of ordinary skill in the pharmaceutical arts.  Likewise, with so lit-
tle predictability in the art that the utility of the invention for its in-
 
 182 See supra note 85. 
 183 Among these exceptions is severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), which 
was only first reported in February 2003.  CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FACT SHEET: BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT SARS 
(2004), http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/pdf/factsheet.pdf.  In contrast, diseases 
such as obesity and diabetes are known historically but have dramatically increased in 
prevalence in recent years.  CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OBESITY AND OVERWEIGHT: U.S. OBESITY TRENDS 1985–2007 
(2008), http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/trends.html; CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NUMBER (IN MILLIONS) OF 
CIVILIAN/NONINSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS WITH DIAGNOSED DIABETES, UNITED STATES, 
1980–2006 (2008), http://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/statistics/prev/national/ 
figpersons.htm.  
 184 According to PhRMA, Phase I, II, and III clinical studies together require six to 
seven years to complete and are followed by FDA review of an applicant’s New Drug 
Application (NDA) for six months to two years.  PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., 
supra note 85, at 4.   
 185 Id. at 3 (“[F]or every 5,000 to 10,000 compounds tested, just 5 will make it to 
clinical trials and, of those, only 1 will eventually receive FDA approval.”). 
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tended purpose is not known for ten years or more,
186
 saying that an 
invention is obvious to one of ordinary skill is quite difficult.  A fac-
tual presumption of nonobviousness applies unless evidence such as 
simultaneous invention by others or the appearance of the invention 
immediately following a demand-side change overcomes this pre-
sumption. 
As with computer inventions, the analysis of postinvention objec-
tive evidence is complicated by the presence of other factors that 
have not figured into the traditional, mechanical-arts-based analysis.  
In particular, both the generally one-to-one patent-to-product corres-
pondence and the regulatory scheme overlaying the development 
and marketing of a drug or biologic product affect this assessment.  
Because the product is almost unquestionably an appropriate surro-
gate for the patent, evidence of commercial success may be useful if 
compared to other drugs or treatments addressing the same condi-
tion.  Artisans’ statements, frequently in the form of clinical-study da-
ta, may be particularly useful because of the general unity of inven-
tion and product.  In particular, the regulatory structure of the 
pharmaceutical industry, which frequently results in abundant objec-
tive data, provides the opportunity to examine the postinvention 
perspective of other artisans in the field.  Yet this regulatory structure 
also suggests that evidence related to commercial success or copying 
may be less relevant because, for example, the requirement of regula-
tory approval results in limited approved patient-treatment options 
and creates additional hurdles for market entry.  Despite these regu-
latory constraints, significant postinvention evidence of the superiori-
ty or inferiority of the invention remains available and useful to cor-
roborate or rebut the presumption of nonobviousness. 
The Federal Circuit has addressed obviousness in the pharma-
ceutical arts numerous times since the KSR decision.  For example, in 
Takeda Chemical Industries v. Alphapharm Pty. Ltd.,187 the court easily 
found a patented pharmaceutical compound to be nonobvious.
188
  
Takeda involved a patent covering a single diabetes compound that 
was structurally similar to a compound disclosed in a prior patent 
covering a broad group of potentially anti-diabetic compounds.
189
  In 
support of the general nonobviousness of novel pharmaceutical 
compounds, even where structurally similar, the court stated, “[I]n 
cases involving new chemical compounds, it remains necessary to 
 
 186 See supra note 85. 
 187 492 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 188 See id. at 1364. 
 189 Id. at 1353. 
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identify some reason that would have led a chemist to modify a 
known compound in a particular manner to establish prima facie ob-
viousness of a new claimed compound.”190  The court’s significant re-
liance on the lack of a reasonable expectation of success as a basis for 
finding nonobviousness further acknowledged the unpredictability in 
the art.
191
  Finally, the court also alluded to the one-to-one patent-to-
product correspondence and considerable evidence of commercial 
success, which undoubtedly did not contradict the presumption of 
nonobviousness.
192
  Thus, the factual presumption of nonobviousness 
was maintained. 
Another case, Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc.,
193
 provides a cautionary 
tale about how far this presumption will go.  In Pfizer, the Federal Cir-
cuit found a pharmaceutical salt form obvious and unpatentable in 
light of the prior disclosure of the chemical structure in its neutral 
form.
194
  Despite the traditional treatment of the pharmaceutical arts 
as unpredictable for patent purposes,
195
 the court found that the 
availability of only fifty-three pharmaceutically acceptable salt-
forming ions motivated this particular combination and that “ob-
viousness cannot be avoided simply by a showing of some degree of 
unpredictability in the art so long as there was a reasonable probabili-
ty of success.”196  Likewise, Pfizer’s significant objective evidence of 
nonobviousness was “in any event insufficiently probative of non-
obviousness to overcome the evidence of the prior art teachings.”197  
Interestingly, the Federal Circuit has already suggested limiting this 
seeming reversal of principles to its “particularized facts.”198 
Generally, by focusing on the objective evidence peculiar to an 
industry and technical problem, the appropriate obviousness “base-
 
 190 Id. at 1357. 
 191 Id. at 1361. 
 192 Id. at 1352–53 (mentioning that the compound claimed in the disputed patent 
was the active ingredient in a drug that grossed $1.7 billion in sales in a single year). 
 193 480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 194 Id. at 1372. 
 195 See, e.g., In re Lalu, 747 F.2d 703, 706–07 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that the ob-
viousness determination ultimately requires inquiring into whether anything in the 
prior art would suggest any expected properties of new chemical compounds); see 
also supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 196 Pfizer, 480 F.3d at 1364. 
 197 Id. at 1369. 
 198 “[O]ur conclusion was based on the ‘particularized facts of this case.’”  Takeda 
Chem. Indus. v. Alphapharm Pty. Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Pfizer, 480 F.3d at 1367).  Thus it seems that this is an instance in which other inven-
tive circumstances would rebut a factual presumption of nonobviousness. 
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line” can be established.  This emphasis on objective evidence may 
counteract any tendency to generalize the KSR decision beyond its 
particular facts.  Thus, despite the apparent demise of the TSM test, a 
fact finder’s intuition about “common sense” is limited to appropri-
ate circumstances.  Courts are also freed from reliance on previous 
cases in a particular technology if they have a means of “fleshing out” 
the Graham analysis to better understand what level of inventiveness is 
required for patentability. 
4. Objective Evidence as the Best Direct Evidence of an 
Industry’s Patent Needs and Resulting in the Proper 
Patent Bargain for Diverse Industries 
While it is not possible or wise to completely generalize the ob-
viousness analysis with respect to the mechanical, computer, and 
pharmaceutical arts, two useful trends do emerge.  First, generalizing 
typical factual circumstances at the time of invention yields a factual 
presumption about obviousness for each industry—a presumption of 
obviousness for mechanical and computer inventions and a presump-
tion of nonobviousness for pharmaceutical inventions.  Second, the 
importance of postinvention evidence varies according to the indus-
try—evidence of commercial success, copying, and laudatory state-
ments deserves the most weight for traditional mechanical inventions 
and the least weight for computer inventions.  Focusing the inquiry 
in this way is critical to lend further predictability and stability to the 
obviousness jurisprudence across industries. 
Of greater significance, the result of these factual presumptions 
comports with the goals of the patent system and corrects previously 
noted judicial errors.  Although the patent system was initially devel-
oped to protect mechanical inventions,
199
 it is more importantly de-
signed to spur the innovation and advancement of the useful arts.
200
  
With the clear focus of innovation now moved beyond mechanical 
arts,
201
 the objective of patent law should not be the broad and strong 
protection of mechanical inventions at the expense of other indus-
tries.  As the KSR decision suggests, the acknowledgment of a general-
ly high level of ordinary skill in the mechanical arts means that many 
discoveries in the broad spectrum of mechanical developments will 
not and should not be patentable for obviousness reasons.  These 
mechanical discoveries still clearly benefit society, but the strong fun-
 
 199 Supra note 136. 
 200 See supra Part II.B.1. 
 201 For a statistical study of these trends, see Allison & Lemley, supra note 77; see 
also supra note 89. 
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damental knowledge and predictability of the art frequently will make 
innovation cheap enough that a first-mover advantage may be suffi-
cient to cover the costs of innovation.
202
  Thus, the particular industri-
al context directly demonstrates the scope of the mechanical arts’ pa-
tent needs, and KSR confirms that a factual presumption of 
obviousness and a corresponding high threshold to patentability are 
proper. 
Similar treatment of computer inventions is also appropriate 
and in the best interest of the public and potential patentees.  A pre-
sumption of obviousness and a high level of ordinary skill will help 
ensure that only true technological breakthroughs are patentable.  
This is the reform that the computer industry seeks in its criticism of 
the current output of the patent system.  By making it considerably 
more difficult to obtain a patent in the computer field, the need for 
extensive patent cross-licensing and pooling is avoided, and patent 
trolls who do not practice under the patents they seek to assert can-
not profit from the unwitting infringement of others.
203
  Considering 
the benefits associated with a contraction of computer patent protec-
tion, the industry will lose little in exchange.  The product develop-
ment cycle and product life cycle are both so short and the products 
at issue generally are so complex that the majority of innovations can 
be protected by the first-mover advantage.
204
  Thus, the true innova-
tors in the computer industry—and not the patent trolls—stand to 
benefit from reducing the availability of patent protection.  Again, 
the analysis of objective evidence leads not only to the proper ob-
viousness presumption but also to a direct expression of the comput-
er industry’s needs. 
Finally, for a multitude of reasons, the presumption of nonob-
viousness for pharmaceutical inventions comports with the goals of 
the patent system.  Evidencing its own needs, the pharmaceutical 
lobby is the strongest opponent of patent reform because it relies so 
heavily on the enforcement of relatively few key patents to recoup its 
extensive investment during its monopoly period.
205
  Without patent 
protection for a particular compound, that compound is unlikely to 
be developed regardless of its public health benefit.  Furthermore, 
without the presumption of broad patent protection for all of its 
products, the pharmaceutical industry in its current form would face 
a significant challenge to its viability because the rewards of a strictly 
 
 202 See supra notes 70, 138–40 and accompanying text. 
 203 See supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text. 
 204 See supra notes 70, 142–47. 
 205 See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
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first-mover advantage system would not be worth the risk associated 
with the high percentage of failures.  This incentive to innovate, such 
that the invention would likely not occur at all but for the monopoly 
prize, is exactly the intended function of the patent system.
206
  Finally, 
where a product is truly obvious, the adversarial system and strong in-
centives for generic competition will likely lead to the proper finding 
of nonobviousness.  Therefore, encouraging the sort of broad protec-
tion that is engendered by a presumption of nonobviousness in the 
pharmaceutical industry is proper, and the industry’s typical inventive 
circumstances reveal its need for this presumption. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The paradox of the nonobviousness standard is that it is both in-
capable of formulation and prone to oversimplification; it is flexible 
in the circumstances of disparate industries and devastating in its un-
certainty.  This is especially clear when considering the long evolu-
tion of the nonobviousness requirement—beginning with a vague re-
quirement of “invention,” followed by Graham’s imprecise four-part 
analysis and the Federal Circuit’s more definite TSM test, and finally 
arriving at the new opportunity for redefinition presented by the KSR 
decision.  Perhaps regrettably, while the Supreme Court’s KSR deci-
sion now mandates a more flexible obviousness determination, it 
does not teach how to achieve this laudable goal without repeating 
the errors of the past—a series of decisions tailoring the obviousness 
determination to particular industries in exactly the wrong way.  For 
innovation to benefit from society’s patent bargain, taking advantage 
of the flexibility of the facially neutral system and more coherently 
recognizing the diverse innovation environments and marketplace 
needs across industries is necessary.  Utilizing technology-specific 
considerations within the obviousness inquiry is the best way to 
achieve the goals of the patent system. 
The ideal approach for federal courts to achieve this harmoniza-
tion is by using a fact-based approach that emphasizes the value of ob-
jective evidence in informing the Graham analysis—to understand 
and compare the actual and the theoretical levels of ordinary skill in 
the art.  This entails using the objective evidence available in every 
determination, especially an expanded understanding of the tradi-
tional “secondary considerations.”  For example, such customary 
preinvention evidence as long-felt but unmet need, the failure of 
others, and simultaneous invention by multiple parties informs the 
 
 206 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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obviousness determination, and these serve as clear guideposts on the 
more generally applicable appearance-timing spectrum.  Similarly, 
degrees of commercial success, copying by others, independent pro-
fessional statements of approval, and comparable postinvention con-
siderations corroborate the results of the analysis of preinvention ob-
jective evidence.  Together, an inclusive inspection of the full breadth 
of pre- and postinvention objective evidence will fill the “Graham 
gap”—that lack of clear teaching on what is “inventive enough.”  By 
interpreting the availability of this evidence broadly, a wealth of con-
crete information becomes available to inform the analysis of the 
theoretical PHOSITA, and the temptation to succumb to hindsight 
bias is reduced. 
When the Graham knowledge gap is filled in this way, patterns 
emerge within particular patenting industries.  Clearly, the mechani-
cal and computer arts generally must surpass a high theoretical de-
gree of ordinary skill because of the advanced technical state of much 
of those arts, the high degree of skill of the average actual artisan, 
and the relatively low degree of uncertainty when inventing, all of 
which together create a presumption of obviousness.  On the other 
hand, the pharmaceutical arts must surpass a considerably lower or-
dinary-skill level because of the high degree of unpredictability in the 
art and the lack of understanding of much of the underlying science, 
both of which create a presumption of nonobviousness.  Although 
these presumptions may be rebutted by the presence of a variety of 
additional objective evidence, those cases will likely be the exception. 
Finally, as a correct response to the divergent needs of these in-
dustries, a fact- and evidence-based approach comports with the pub-
lic policy goals of the patent system.  In particular, the computer in-
dustry will benefit from a higher patentability standard via a 
corresponding decrease in the frequency of patent thickets and pa-
tent trolls, and the pharmaceutical industry will view a presumption 
of patentability as an adequate safeguard of the high-risk investments 
required to support lengthy and uncertain drug development.  Thus, 
objective evidence serves not only to improve and clarify the obvious-
ness determination itself, it is also the best direct evidence of these 
industries’ innovation needs.  By performing both functions, it easily 
harmonizes and protects the interests of both society and innovator—
the two parties to the patent bargain. 
 
